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INTRODUCTION
Suppose a government agency tasks its purchasing agent with buying a
set of computer servers for the agency’s use, and the agent contacts a tech-
nology company to make the purchase. After selecting the needed servers,
the agent learns of the servers’ fair market value but does not negotiate
with the technology company to obtain the lowest possible price. Instead,
unbeknownst to the government, the agent agrees with the technology
company’s sales manager to purchase the servers on behalf of the govern-
ment for an amount significantly above their fair market value, and, in
return, the company agrees to give the agent a hefty side payment for
inflating the company’s profits. In this scenario, the technology company
gives a side payment to the purchasing agent to influence the agent’s offi-
cial act–purchasing the servers for the government. Their agreement fits
the classic definition of public sector bribery,1 a crime outlawed in virtu-
ally every jurisdiction in the world.2 Both parties could face heavy prison
sentences and fines for engaging in this corrupt act.3
Imagine now that the purchasing agent’s employer is not a govern-
ment agency, but instead a private sector company. The purchasing agent
buys the same quantity of identical servers on behalf of her company for
the same inflated price and receives the same side payment unbeknownst
to her employer. Under this scenario, the arrangement between the
purchasing agent and technology company still constitutes bribery, but of
1. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 187 (7th ed. 1999) (bribery is “the corrupt
payment, receipt, or solicitation of a private favor for official action.”); 11 C.J.S. Bribery § 1
(2008) (defining bribery). Assume for the purpose of this scenario that the purchasing agent
qualifies under the pertinent bribery statute as a “public official.” See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201
(2012) (defining public official as including any “employee or person acting for or on behalf
of the United States, or any department, agency or branch of Government thereof, including
the District of Columbia, in any official function, under or by authority of any such depart-
ment, agency, or branch of Government”).
2. See Claire Moore Dickerson, Political Corruption: Free-Flowing Opportunism, 14
CONN. J. INT’L L. 393, 395 (1999) (“[S]cholars have asserted that every country has laws
against bribery of its own officials.”).
3. See Philip M. Nichols, The Business Case for Complying with Bribery Laws, 49 AM.
BUS. L.J. 325, 355–56 (2012) (discussing penalties for domestic public bribery and listing pen-
alty ranges).
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a form that transpires wholly within the private sector, as no government
official is involved. Sanctioning this type of bribery, known as private brib-
ery or commercial bribery, garners wildly inconsistent treatment from gov-
ernments across the world.4 The perpetrators of this offense may face
heavy prison sentences and fines, nominal fines, or no criminal sanctions,
depending upon the jurisdiction in which the private bribery agreement
occurs.5
Public and private bribery are twin forms of corruption, with public
officials and private persons, respectively, abusing entrusted power for
personal gain by accepting bribes.6 Both bribery forms share core concep-
tual features of fiduciary duty violations and betrayals of trust and can be
viewed as essentially the same offense–perpetrators corruptly giving or re-
ceiving benefits in exchange for undue advantage. In fact, the only funda-
mental difference between the two forms is that in private bribery, the
recipient is a private agent rather than a public official.
A significant volume of research demonstrates that public and private
bribery each generate a host of economic and social harms that impair
governments, commercial entities, global markets, and the general public.7
For instance, both bribery forms have the power to disrupt international
market economies by distorting fair competition within and across mar-
kets, interfering with global trade, and hampering economic develop-
ment.8 Grounded in deceit, both bribery forms also bring detrimental
effects to social spheres in part by undermining the moral virtues of trust,
confidence, and loyalty necessary for the development and maintenance of
healthy interpersonal and economic relationships.9
While public and private bribery “are two variants of the same censur-
able conduct,”10 stakeholders respond to the two bribery forms in radi-
cally dissimilar ways. Public bribery generates widespread anger and
concern from citizens and growing remedial action from governments
4. See Barbara Huber, Supranational Measures, in PRIVATE COMMERCIAL BRIBERY
559, 564 (Gunter Heine et al. eds., 2003) (discussing rates of private bribery criminalization).
5. See infra Part I.C.2 (analyzing private bribery penalties).
6. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], CORRUPTION: A GLOS-
SARY OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS IN CRIMINAL LAW 22 (2008), available at http://
www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/41194428.pdf [hereinafter OECD CORRUPTION] (defining
corruption as the “abuse of public or private office for personal gain”).
7. See, e.g., Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 83, 86 (2007).
8. See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Commercial Bribery and the Sherman Act: The Case
for Per Se Illegality, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 365, 384 (1987) (explaining how bribers “drive out
competitors and thereby achieve a significant increase in market concentration”).
9. See, e.g., State v. Bunch, 177 S.W. 932, 935 (Ark. 1915) (“Bribery is an offense
against public justice. The essence of it is the prostitution of a public trust, the betrayal of
public interests, the debauchment of the public conscience.”).
10. Antonio Argandon˜a, The 1996 ICC Report on Extortion and Bribery in Interna-
tional Business Transactions, 6 BUS. ETHICS: A EUR. REV. 134, 142 (1997).
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worldwide.11 Solid bodies of domestic criminal laws, coupled with mount-
ing worldwide enforcement actions, reflect a global focus on thwarting
public bribery as it occurs domestically and internationally.12
Conversely, governments largely ignore the same corrupt activity
when it transpires within the business community but without the presence
of a government official. Citizens often remain unaware of the private
bribery phenomenon and its criminalization or lack thereof.13 In many
countries the criminal law either plays a minor or no role in addressing
private bribery, leaving the corrupt conduct effectively unsanctioned.14
Most countries that sanction private bribery essentially separate their
public and private bribery prohibitions into two distinct statutory offenses,
typically with serious criminal penalties assigned to public bribery viola-
tions and nominal sanctions assigned to private bribery violations.15 More-
over, there is an enforcement trend where prosecutors focus resources on
public bribery law enforcement while ignoring private bribery even as it
blooms in marketplaces.16 France and Japan, for instance, place their pub-
lic bribery statutes in their penal codes, where such statutes receive due
attention, but the two countries place their private bribery legislation in
labor and commercial codes, respectively, where the statutes lie dor-
mant.17 Given the lax or nonexistent regulation, private bribery currently
flourishes across industry segments, and by failing to adequately combat
this offense, governments expose their citizens and business communities
to its significant moral and economic harms.
This Article analyzes the conceptual and practical dynamics of bribery
as it courses through public and private sectors and critiques the divergent
legislative approaches to criminalizing both bribery forms. It advocates for
the adoption of specific statutory reforms to combat private bribery more
effectively as part of a larger anti-corruption regime and to limit the differ-
ences between criminal laws governing public and private bribery so that
sanctions balance for both bribery forms. Part I provides an overview of
public and private bribery as manifestations of corruption and an analysis
of international approaches to public and private bribery criminalization.
11. See, e.g., FRITZ F. HEIMANN, SHOULD FOREIGN BRIBERY BE A CRIME? 7 (1994)
(“There is no country in the world where bribery is either legally or morally acceptable.”), as
cited in Peter J. Henning, Public Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of International Cor-
ruption Conventions and United States Law, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 793, 793 n.2
(2001).
12. See infra Part I.B.2.
13. See Edmund Searby, Domestic Commercial Bribery: An Often Overlooked Issue,
BUS. CRIMES BULL., Aug. 1, 2012, at 3 (discussing public unawareness of private bribery).
14. See Gunter Heine, Comparative Analysis, in PRIVATE COMMERCIAL BRIBERY,
supra note 4, at 603, 634.
15. See infra notes 110–11 (describing public and private bribery criminalization
trends).
16. See infra Part I.C.2 (describing enforcement trends).
17. See Stephane Bonifassi, France, in PRIVATE COMMERCIAL BRIBERY, supra note 4,
at 87, 91; Toyoji Saito, Japan, in PRIVATE COMMERCIAL BRIBERY, supra note 4, at 191, 197,
204–05.
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Next, Part II critically examines the theoretical and practical justifications
for treating the twin bribery forms as separate offenses. Finally, Part III
proposes a set of robust legislative reforms to re-design private bribery
criminalization and to synchronize it with the legislative treatment re-
ceived by its public bribery twin.
I. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE BRIBERY ARE TWIN MANIFESTATIONS
OF CORRUPTION
A. The International Fight against Corruption
Corruption, generally defined as the abuse of entrusted power for per-
sonal gain, permeates international markets.18 Given that corrupt prac-
tices are naturally shrouded in secrecy, their prevalence and economic
impact are notoriously difficult to measure, but approximations do exist.19
The World Economic Forum estimates that worldwide corruption costs
more than $2.6 trillion annually, roughly five percent of global gross do-
mestic product (“GDP”).20 International surveys routinely reflect the per-
vasiveness of the problem across countries and particularly in rapid-
growth markets. For example, in a recent Ernst & Young survey of busi-
ness executives, thirty-nine percent of respondents polled from forty-three
countries agreed that corrupt business practices happen frequently in their
countries, with a survey high of eighty-four percent of Brazilian respon-
dents agreeing that widespread corruption exists in their country.21
Corruption blooms in many forms. Perpetrators may commit fraud,
launder money, construct illegal cartels, misstate financial statements,
bribe officials, and exert undue influence, among other acts. The acts have
the collective power to cripple governments and decimate economies.22
Every corrupt act covertly taxes the cost of doing business and weakens
economic growth, and cumulatively, “corruption not only erodes the trust
and confidence that citizens hold in one another and in their governments,
it also robs citizens and governments of resources that could be invested in
18. See, e.g., OECD CORRUPTION, supra note 6 (defining corruption); Joshua V. Barr
et al., A Legal Perspective on the Use of Models in the Fight against Corruption, 8 S.C. J. INT’L
L. & BUS. 267, 270–71 (2012) (discussing definitions of corruption).
19. See, e.g., TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX (2012),
available at http://files.transparency.org/content/download/537/2229/file/2012_CPI_brochure
_EN.pdf.
20. See Global Agenda Council on Anti-Corruption & Transparency 2012–2014,
WORLD ECON. F., http://www.weforum.org/content/global-agenda-council-anti-corruption-
2012 (last visited Apr. 10, 2014).
21. ERNST & YOUNG, GROWING BEYOND: A PLACE FOR INTEGRITY 12TH GLOBAL
FRAUD SURVEY 4 (2012), available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Global-
Fraud-Survey-a-place-for-integrity-12th-Global-Fraud-Survey/$FILE/EY-12th-GLOBAL-
FRAUD-SURVEY.pdf.
22. See Ethan S. Burger & Mary S. Holland, Why the Private Sector Is Likely to Lead
the Next Stage in the Global Fight Against Corruption, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 45, 45–7
(2006) (detailing effects of corruption); J.S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 419 (1967) (same).
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a brighter future.”23 Former United Nations Secretary General Kofi An-
nan reminded the audience at the 2003 U.N. Convention against Corrup-
tion that the most disadvantaged members of society experience
corruption’s severest effects because “corruption hurts the poor dispropor-
tionately–by diverting funds intended for development, undermining a
government’s ability to provide basic services, feeding inequality and in-
justice, and discouraging foreign investment and aid.”24
B. Global Corruption in the Public Sector: Domestic and Transnational
Public Bribery
1. A Brief Overview of Public Bribery and Its Harms
Public bribery, or the bribing of public officials, is one of the quintes-
sential forms of corruption.25 Legal scholars commonly define the offense
as the giving, offering, promising, taking, or agreeing to take money or
other consideration in order to improperly influence a public official’s ac-
tions.26 Colloquially known as the world’s second oldest profession, brib-
ery features a quid pro quo relationship between a public official’s specific
act and a payment made to influence that act.27 It is bribery’s this-for-that
element that separates a bribe from a legitimate gift, for one gives legiti-
mate gifts with no strings attached.28
A public bribe may feature domestic and transnational facets, as per-
petrators may bribe domestic and foreign officials. Perpetrators proffer
bribes, directly or indirectly, to domestic and foreign public officials essen-
tially for the same reason: to corrupt or subvert an official’s loyalty and
judgment and thereby obtain an unfair advantage.29 Legislators and schol-
ars conceptually divide the offense into active and passive forms. The term
23. International Anti-Corruption Day: What They’re Saying, TRANSPARENCY INT’L
(Dec. 9, 2012), http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/20121209_feature_international_
anti-corruption_day_2012 (quoting Hillary Clinton).
24. U.N. Secretary-General, Statement on the Adoption by the General Assembly of
the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (Oct. 31, 2003), http://www.unodc.org/
unodc/en/treaties/CAC/background/secretary-general-speech.html.
25. See JOHN T. NOONAN, BRIBES, at xi (1984) (discussing history of bribery); George
D. Brown, The Gratuities Offense and the RICO Approach to Independent Counsel Jurisdic-
tion, 86 GEO. L.J. 2045, 2051 (1998) (“Bribes are an example, perhaps the quintessential
example, of political corruption.”).
26. See supra note 1 (listing various definitions of bribery); NOONAN, supra note 25
(defining bribery as “an inducement improperly influencing the performance of a public
function meant to be gratuitously exercised.”).
27. See Brown, supra note 25, at 2048; Joseph T. Wells, Fraudbasics: Ancient Corrup-
tion, FRAUD MAGAZINE (Jan./Feb. 2002), available at http://www.fraud-magazine.com/article.
aspx?id=4294968150 (“Bribery, it could be argued, is mankind’s second oldest profession.”).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 404–05
(1999) (explaining that “for bribery there must be a quid pro quo—a specific intent to give or
receive something of value in exchange for an official act.”)(emphasis omitted).
29. See United States v. Duvall, 846 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1988).
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“active bribery” refers to the promising, offering, or giving of a bribe,30
and “passive bribery” refers to the accepting or agreeing to accept a
bribe.31
The alleged facts in United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2007),
illustrate the mechanics of public bribery at work in an international con-
text.32 In Kay, a federal jury convicted two American Rice, Inc. corporate
executives under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) for bribing
Haitian customs officials to import rice.33 The United States executives
allegedly paid bribes to the Haitian officials in order to reduce duties and
taxes on the rice their company exported to Haiti.34 The bribes functioned
as consideration for the unlawful evasion of customs duties and sales taxes,
and the bribes’ ultimate effect, which was tax savings, assisted the execu-
tives in retaining lucrative overseas business.35
Public bribery invites universal condemnation for the social and eco-
nomic damage it causes. It generates collective moral outrage that tran-
scends historical periods and cultural boundaries.36 Scholars have
thoroughly catalogued its attendant harms to the public order and to inter-
national markets.37 Bribing public officials especially impairs governmen-
tal integrity and effectiveness, as it restricts a government’s capacity to
execute vital functions, distorts the apportionment of government spend-
ing, reduces funding for public health, education, and other social welfare
areas, decreases the quality of infrastructure, and erodes public confidence
in governmental institutions, among other public ills.38 Moreover, this
type of bribery deters economic efficiencies within companies and across
industries, and it causes long-term harm to a host country’s economic de-
velopment.39 Empirical research demonstrates public bribery’s negative
impact on global economies, including its power to reduce private foreign
30. See Jamila Lajcakova, Violation of Human Rights Through State Tolerance of
Street-Level Bribery: Case Study, Slovakia, 9 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 111, 123 (2003); Bruce
Zagaris & Shaila Lakhani Ohri, Emergence of an International Enforcement Regime on
Transnational Corruption in the Americas, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 53, 70 (1999) (describ-
ing active bribery as defined by OECD Anti-Bribery Convention to include bribery that is
“committed by the person who promises or gives the bribe”).
31. Lajcakova, supra note 30, at 122–23.
32. United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 439-40 (5th Cir. 2007).
33. Id. at 439–40.
34. Id. at 439.
35. See id. at 439–40.
36. See generally NOONAN, supra note 25, at 4 (detailing cross-cultural bribery con-
demnation across historical periods).
37. For an overview of the harms caused by transnational bribery, see Philip M. Nich-
ols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and Fragmentation, 24 YALE
J. INT’L L. 257, 274–79 (1999).
38. See BRUCE ZAGARIS, INTERNATIONAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME 96 (2010); David
Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A Principled Approach, 33 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 593, 594, 596–97 (2000).
39. See David Hess & Cristie L. Ford, Corporate Corruption and Reform Undertak-
ings: A New Approach to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 307, 320 (2008).
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investment into countries that host bribery, lower a host country’s tax
base, and positively correlate with reduced economic development.40 The
solid body of scholarship overwhelmingly concludes that bribing domestic
and foreign public officials harms governments, commercial entities,
global markets, and the public at large.41
2. A Strong International Consensus Exists to Deter Public Bribery
Virtually all countries outlaw the bribery of domestic public officials,42
and a growing subset criminalizes the bribery of foreign public officials.43
The United States’ enactment in 1977 of the seminal FCPA, which
“mak[es] it unlawful for certain classes of persons and entities to make
payments to foreign government officials to assist in obtaining or retaining
business,”44 ignited a global anti-corruption movement to combat public
bribery worldwide.45 The anti-bribery measures of international organiza-
tions, such as the 1997 OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of For-
eign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (“OECD
Convention”)46 and the 1999 Council of Europe Criminal Law Conven-
tion on Corruption (“Council of Europe Convention”),47 significantly fa-
cilitated the creation and development of transnational bribery laws by
requiring signatory countries to criminalize bribery involving foreign pub-
lic officials.48 According to TRACE International, “[t[he goal of such laws
and conventions is to create a fair and transparent international business
market rather than one skewed by under-the-table deals that enrich gov-
ernment officials at the expense of their fellow citizens.”49
Countries generally punish domestic and international public bribery
violations typically with prison sentences and fines.50 While enforcement
40. See Nichols, supra note 37, at 275; Krever, supra note 7, at 86.
41. See Nichols, supra note 37, at 274.
42. See id. at 352.
43. See id. at 362 (listing over 50 countries that criminalize the bribery of foreign
officials).
44. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2014).
45. See James A. Barta & Julia Chapman, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 49 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 825, 851 (2012).
46. See OECD, CONVENTION ON COMBATTING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFI-
CIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND OTHER RELATED DOCUMENTS 7
(2011) [hereinafter OECD CONVENTION], available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/
ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf.
47. Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption art. 5, Jan. 27, 1999,
C.E.T.S. No. 173 [hereinafter Council of Europe Convention], available at http://conventions.
coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/173.htm.
48. See Nichols, supra note 37, at 362 (discussing the impact of international agree-
ments upon the creation of laws prohibiting foreign public official bribery).
49. TRACE INT’L, GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT REPORT 2011 1 (2011), available at http://
www.traceinternational.org/data/public/documents/GlobalEnforcementReport2011_000-6472
3-1.pdf.
50. See Nichols, supra note 37, at 355 (discussing domestic public bribery penalties).
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of transnational anti-bribery laws in many countries has traditionally been
lacking, increased enforcement efforts are on the rise worldwide.51 More
countries are enacting laws that criminalize transnational public bribery,
and are gradually initiating prosecutions under these laws.52
C. Global Corruption in the Private Sector: Domestic and Transnational
Private Bribery
1. A Brief Overview of Private Bribery and Its Harms
Public bribery’s twin, private bribery, is a separate bribery offense that
transpires entirely within the private sector. The commission of a private
bribery offense implicates no public officials. The offense involves the
bribing of private sector employees or other types of private sector agents
so that the agents show favor to the briber when carrying out their work-
place duties.53 At common law, a private bribe is an “offer of considera-
tion to another’s employee or agent in the expectation that the latter will,
without fully informing his principal of the ‘gift,’ be sufficiently influenced
by the offer to favor the offeror over other competitors.”54 Like public
bribery, private bribery may be separated into an active form, where the
briber offers or gives the bribe, and a passive form, where the agent ac-
cepts or agrees to accept the bribe.55 The offense may proceed domesti-
cally or with international aspects, as perpetrators may bribe agents of
domestic and foreign businesses.
The briber’s corruption of the agent is the essence of private bribery.56
In a private bribery offense, the briber proffers a bribe with the intent to
induce the agent to act in the interest of the briber instead of the agent’s
principal. The agent who accepts a bribe violates a contractual duty of
loyalty to his principal and “abuses his [principal]’s trust and loyalty for his
51. See id. at 355, 366 (analyzing transnational bribery enforcement efforts); TRANS-
PARENCY INT’L, EXPORTING CORRUPTION? COUNTRY ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD ANTI-
BRIBERY CONVENTION PROGRESS REPORT 2012 4 (2012), available at http://files.transparency
.org/content/download/510/2109/file/2012_ExportingCorruption_OECDProgress_EN.pdf
(classifying signatory countries into one of the following foreign anti-bribery enforcement
categories: active, moderate, little or no enforcement).
52. Nichols, supra note 37, at 366 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
53. See Jeffrey R. Boles, Examining the Lax Treatment of Commercial Bribery in the
United States: A Prescription for Reform, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 119, 119–23 (2014) (providing
overview of private bribery).
54. 2 RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES § 49 (3d ed. 1968). See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 204 (8th ed. 1999) (de-
fining commercial bribery as “[t]he knowing solicitation or acceptance of a benefit in ex-
change for violating an oath of fidelity, such as that owed by an employee, partner, trustee, or
attorney.”) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 224.8(1)).
55. See, e.g., Council of Europe Convention, supra note 47, arts. 7–8 (defining active
and passive bribery); United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, An-
nex, art. 21, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4/Annex (Oct. 31, 2003) [hereinafter United Nations Con-
vention Against Corruption] (same).
56. JSG Trading Corp. v. Dep’t of Agric., 235 F.3d 608, 615 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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own economic benefit.”57 In delineating the statutory elements of the of-
fense, jurisdictions largely require that the private bribery transpire with-
out the knowledge and consent of the agent’s principal.58 This secrecy
element requires a showing that the bribery participants hid their bribery
agreement and the attendant bribe(s) from the principal. The participants’
secrecy and dishonesty reinforce the corrupt nature of their actions.59
Private bribery typically occurs in the course of commercial activity
where a company makes covert payments to another company’s employee,
unbeknownst to this employee’s employer company, and the employee in
return steers business to the bribing company and to the exclusion of the
bribing company’s competitors.60 The bribing company usually clinches a
business contract with the employee’s company as a result of the bribe.61
By winning this contract, the briber attains its ultimate goal and the bribe
facilitates that goal.
United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 154145, at *3–*4, *28 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011), demonstrates a
typical private bribery transaction with an international flavor. In Carson,
the defendants, U.S. citizens who were executives of Controlled Compo-
nents Inc. (“CCI”) at the time, allegedly paid roughly $2 million in bribes
to “foreign employees of [CCI’s] foreign compan[y]” customers during a
five year period.62 The defendants purportedly gave monetary payments
and gifts and arranged extravagant vacations and entertainment for these
employees. In short, the bribes served “the purpose of assisting in securing
[CCI] business.”63
Like its public counterpart, private bribery impairs a multitude of pub-
lic and private interests, and these harms can be separated into two over-
arching categories: fiduciary duty violations and unfair competitive effects.
The offense’s most well-recognized harm is perhaps a violation of the
57. Peter Burckhardt & Benjamin Borsodi, Switzerland Tightens Anti-Corruption
Laws, Focuses on Private Sector Bribery, 23 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 213 (2007).
58. See, e.g., Mantek Div. of NCH Corp. v. Share Corp., 780 F.2d 702, 705 n.3 (7th Cir.
1986) (“The essence of commercial bribery is that the [briber] is secretly giving a bribe to
the . . . agent to induce the agent to betray his principal . . . .”); Peter J.P. Tak, The Nether-
lands, in PRIVATE COMMERCIAL BRIBERY, supra note 4, at 275, 287 (discussing the secrecy
element in the private bribery statute under Dutch law).
59. See Tak, supra note 58, at 287 (“The corrupt and untrustworthy behavior is the
non-disclosure by the bribed person.”).
60. See Note, Commercial Bribery: The Need for Legislation in Minnesota, 46 MINN. L.
REV. 599, 599–600 (1962) [hereinafter Need for Legislation] (explaining that private bribery
usually occurs in commercial transactions); see Boles, supra note 53, at 145.
61. Private bribery typically concludes with the briber obtaining a business contract
with the bribery recipient’s employer company. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Politics, Corrup-
tion, and the Sherman Act After City of Columbia’s Blighted View, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
141, 169 (1993) (discussing prototypical case of private bribery).
62. United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154145,
at *3–*4, *28 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011).
63. Id. at *4–*5.
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bribed agent’s fiduciary duty of loyalty.64 A universal facet of contract law
recognizes that agents owe a general duty of loyalty in relation to their
principals’ affairs or business,65 and agents violate this duty and thereby
harm their principals when they accept bribes in their role as agents.66
These principals also face substantial economic losses when their agents
accept bribes.67 In the normal transactional course, the bribers surrepti-
tiously add the cost of the bribes into the business contracts that they enter
into with the bribed agents’ principals.68 The principals correspondingly
suffer losses, at a minimum, in the amount of the bribes when the agents of
those principals accept the bribes and purchase the bribers’ goods or ser-
vices on behalf of their principals.69 Hence the duty of loyalty violation
may foster heavy financial losses for these principals victimized by the
offense.
Private bribery also causes public and private sector harm through the
anti-competitive effects it engenders. The private bribery scheme provides
the briber with an unfair competitive advantage by eliminating from con-
sideration products or services offered by the bribing company’s competi-
tors in the usual course of business.70 This method of unfair competition
may severely disadvantage industry competitors, potentially forcing them
from the marketplace,71 and thus distort any smooth functioning of do-
64. See, e.g., 2660 Woodley Rd. Joint Venture v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 369 F.3d 732, 737
n.4 (3d Cir. 2004) (“As a general principle, a critical element of commercial bribery is the
breach of the duty of fidelity.”); Heine, supra note 14, at 614 (discussing the duty of loyalty
violation as recognized under the laws of France, the Netherlands, Korea and Italy).
65. See Huber, supra note 4, at 577 (analyzing breach of duty violations as addressed
by supranational conventions).
66. See, e.g., UNITED KINGDOM LAW COMMISSION, REFORMING BRIBERY – A CONSUL-
TATION PAPER 27 (2007), available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp185_Re-
forming_Bribery_consultation.pdf (“The principal and agent model regards the impropriety
in bribery (connected to an advantage conferred or to be conferred on the agent) as the
breach of a duty of loyalty owed by an agent to his or her principal.”).
67. See Novartis Corp. v. Luppino (In re Luppino), 221 B.R. 693, 703 n.4 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that commercial bribery is almost certain to cause economic harm to
the principals of the bribed agents).
68. See State v. Cohen, No. 1 CA-CR 97-0707, 1999 Ariz. App. LEXIS 49, at *13 (Apr.
1, 1999) (referencing how the briber adds the cost of the bribe into the contract it enters into
with the bribed agent’s principal); Joan Jimenez Queralt, Spain, in PRIVATE COMMERCIAL
BRIBERY, supra note 4, at 353, 365 (“[C]ommercial practices show that the bribery, in one
way or another, is often included in the price or value of the transaction to which the corpo-
ration is a party, so that the corporation employing a corrupt manager suffers damage.”).
69. United States v. Fagan, 821 F.2d 1002, 1009 (5th Cir. 1987). The principals’ eco-
nomic losses translate into corresponding losses for shareholders and others with ownership
interests in businesses. See Heine, supra note 14, at 613–14 (detailing how private bribery
adversely affects corporate assets).
70. See Gevurtz, supra note 8 at 384.
71. See Jaroslav Fenyk, Czech Republic, in PRIVATE COMMERCIAL BRIBERY, supra
note 4, at 13, 28 (“[Private bribery may] jeopardize the operation or development of a com-
petitor’s company by acting contrary to the rules on economic competition, or contrary to
accepted practices of competition.”).
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mestic and international markets.72 In addition, research findings demon-
strate that private bribery’s anti-competitive effects harm consumers
through higher prices and poorer quality goods and services.73 Professor
Madeleine Leijonhufvud notes that, “To the extent that bribery in the pri-
vate sector results in goods and services becoming more expensive, their
quality becoming inferior, or that they are marketed without truthful in-
formation, it is ultimately the general public that suffers.”74 Consumers
bear the final cost of private bribery through an “undue surtax” on the
goods and services affected by the bribery.75 If left unfettered, transna-
tional private bribery threatens the existence of free markets, given that
the offense disrupts the proper functioning of global market economies by
interfering with international trade, distorting fair competition and imped-
ing economic development.76
2. Private Bribery Is Inconsistently Criminalized, with
Minimal Enforcement Globally
While virtually all jurisdictions criminalize some form of public brib-
ery,77 many ignore formally addressing bribery in the private sector. Tradi-
tionally, “the fight against corruption has centered around active and
passive bribery of national public officials, as well as of international pub-
lic officials,” to the exclusion of addressing corruption in the private sec-
tor.78 Numerous countries with relatively powerful national economies,
72. See Heine, supra note 14, at 613 (“Commercial bribery is seen as a factor that
distorts or prevents fair competition and, thus, the proper functioning of the market.”).
73. See Gevurtz, supra note 8, at 365 (1987) (detailing private bribery’s “significant toll
on consumer welfare” through price and quality competition erosion); Note, Bribery in Com-
mercial Relationships, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1248 n.6 (1932) [hereinafter, Bribery in Com-
mercial Relationships] (“The public, by paying higher prices and receiving inferior quality,
bears the cost of this widespread graft.”).
74. Madeleine Leijonhufvud, Sweden, in PRIVATE COMMERCIAL BRIBERY, supra note
4, at 401, 411–12. Accord Searby, supra note 13, at 2 (explaining that private bribery poses
obvious dangers to free markets as the offense yield significantly inflated prices and inferior
products in the marketplace).
75. Luigi Foffani & Roberto Acquaroli, Italy, in PRIVATE COMMERCIAL BRIBERY,
supra note 4, at 149, 153.
76. See UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY ACT 2010 – GUI-
DANCE 2 (2011) available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-
guidance.pdf (“At stake is the principle of free and fair competition, which stands diminished
by each bribe offered or accepted.”); Joint Action, 1998 O.J. (L 358) 2 (European Union
Joint Action finding that private bribery “distorts fair competition and undermines the prin-
ciples of openness and freedom of markets, and in particular the smooth functioning of the
internal market, and also militates against transparency and openness in international
trade”); Heine, supra note 14, at 616–17 (analyzing international responses to private brib-
ery’s effects upon free competition).
77. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
78. Huber, supra note 4, at 564.
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such as India,79 Japan,80 Thailand,81 Philippines,82 Saudi Arabia,83 and In-
donesia,84 do not criminalize private bribery, whether in domestic or inter-
national business transactions. Among countries that do criminalize
private bribery, the number of prosecutions is generally miniscule.85
The disparate treatment of private bribery in the United States exem-
plifies the haphazard approach taken by legislatures globally. Jurisdictions
within the United States do not uniformly criminalize private bribery. At
the federal level, there is no general federal criminal statute in the United
States that outlaws the offense.86 The federal government has the ability
to prosecute the offense indirectly through the Travel Act,87 the mail and
wire fraud statutes,88 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act (“RICO”),89 but these statutes contain application restrictions
79. See Private Sector Bribery Could Become Criminal Offence: PM, TIMES OF INDIA
(Oct. 21, 2011, 1:33 PM), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Private-sector-bribery-
could-become-criminal-offence-PM/articleshow/10439539.cms (“Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh on Friday said [the] government is considering changes in [the] law to make private
sector bribery a criminal offence.”).
80. NORTON ROSE, ANTI-CORRUPTION IN ASIA PACIFIC 22 (2010) http://www.norton
rosegraduates.com/sites/default/files/media-archive/pdfs/The%20anti-corruption%20guide
.pdf (noting that private sector bribery is not criminalized in Japan).
81. Id. at 28 (noting that there is no private sector bribery offense in Thailand).
82. Id. at 24 (“There is as yet, no offence of private sector bribery” in the Philippines).
83. See Saudi Arabia Country Profile, BUS. ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL, http:
//www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/middle-east-north-africa/saudi-arabia/
initiatives/public-anti-corruption-initiatives.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2014) (reporting that
Saudi Arabia’s Law for Combating Bribery does not cover purely private sector bribery).
84. See ASHEESH GOEL, INTERNATIONAL ANTI-BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION TRENDS
AND DEVELOPMENTS 166 (2012), available at http://www.ropesgray.com/files/upload/2012
0521_ABC_Book.pdf (private sector bribery is not an offense under Indonesian law).
85. See Heine, supra note 14, at 625, 634 (describing minimal private bribery prosecu-
tion rates in numerous countries).
86. See Boles, supra note 53, at 135.
87. The Travel Act prohibits the use of an instrumentality of interstate or foreign com-
merce to commit “unlawful activity” under U.S. state or federal law. Travel Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1952(a)(3) (2013). The Act defines “unlawful activity” to include bribery “in violation of
the laws of the State in which committed or of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)(2).
This statutory definition of “bribery” encompasses private bribery offenses. United States v.
Perrin, 444 U.S. 37, 50 (1979).
88. The mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343,
prohibit the use of mail and wire communications, respectively, in furtherance of any scheme
to defraud, and courts find that private bribery activity qualifies under these statutes as a
scheme to defraud. See United States v. Hausmann, 345 F.3d 952, 957 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he
knowing payer of an illegal kickback is criminally liable for conspiracy to commit mail or
wire fraud to the same extent as the recipient of such a payment.”).
89. The RICO Act prohibits “racketeering activity” as conducted through an ongoing
criminal enterprise, and the Act specifies that “racketeering activity” includes “bribery . . .
which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (2012). Courts find that “bribery” under the statute encom-
passes private bribery. See United States v. Bowling, No. 6:09-16, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
129708, at *26 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 7, 2010) (noting that “commercial bribery . . . constitute[s] [a]
valid RICO predicate” and collecting cases).
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that limit their ability to address domestic and transactional private brib-
ery comprehensively.90 Moreover, the federal government’s anti-private
bribery enforcement efforts under these statutes have been decidedly
weak.91
Within the United States, state legislatures radically differ in their
treatment of private bribery. Some states criminalize the offense, while
others do not.92 Those states that criminalize private bribery can be sepa-
rated into further categories. Some states penalize the offense as a felony
carrying potentially heavy incarceration sentences and fines, whereas
other states choose to penalize the offense as a misdemeanor with minimal
jail time and/or minor fines.93 State governments rarely prosecute private
bribery, and the offense has earned a reputation as “the most under-prose-
cuted crime in penal law.”94
Despite the widespread lack of transnational regulation and enforce-
ment, there is a growing international movement to combat private brib-
ery through the enactment of domestic criminal laws. The movement
stems largely from the initiatives of the United Nations,95 the Council of
90. By their operation, the federal mail and wire fraud statutes would only apply to
private bribery conduct involving the use of mail and wire communications, respectively. See
supra note 88 and accompanying text. The Travel Act and RICO Act have predicate act
requirements that restrict their ability to combat private bribery offenses. In order for the
federal government to prosecute private bribery under these statutes, the conduct at issue
must transpire in a state that criminalizes private bribery. See Boles, supra note 53, at 138. If
the bribery transpires within a state that has not criminalized the offense, federal prosecutors
may not use these federal statutes to prosecute the offense.
91. See John S. Siffert & Jed S. Rakoff, 5–22 BUSINESS CRIME P 22.01 (2012) (noting
that “there has been limited prosecutorial activity” in the area of private bribery); JOHN P.
RUPP & DAVID FINK, FOREIGN COMMERCIAL BRIBERY AND THE LONG REACH OF U.S. LAW
(2012), available at http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/6f93a9ee-340d-49b3-83fe-252d3ddc
8ced/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/5af5fff4-f264-42f2-aace-2781d6869cd9/Foreign_
Commercial_Bribery_and_the_Long_Reach_of_U.S._Law.pdf (“The U.S. government has
not used the mail and wire fraud statutes to prosecute foreign commercial bribery wholly
unrelated to the bribery of government officials. . . . [T]he mail and wire fraud statutes in this
respect remains unrealized.”). Federal prosecutions of transnational private bribery have
been especially minimal. In what appears to be the first instance of its kind, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice has recently brought Travel Act charges to prosecute a set of U.S. executives
for engaging in transnational private bribery. See Carson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154145, at
*37–38 (rejecting defendants’ arguments that the Travel Act only applies to conduct occur-
ring within the United States).
92. See Boles, supra note 53, at 129–35 (discussing state law approaches to private
bribery criminalization).
93. Compare R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-7-5 (2012) (violators of private bribery statute face
up to twenty years in prison and/or fines up to $50,000 or three times the amount of the
bribe, whichever is greater) with VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-444, 18.2-11 (2012) (violators of
private bribery statute simply face “a fine of not more than $ 500.”). See also Boles, supra
note 53, at 131 (detailing state law private bribery penalty disparities).
94. Bob Wacker, Inside the Case of Commercial Bribery: How a Kickback Scheme in
Hawaii Led to LI Sting, NEWSDAY, Feb. 8, 1988, at B1.
95. The United Nations Convention against Corruption, which assembled in 2005, rec-
ommends that member states consider criminalizing private bribery. See United Nations
Convention Against Corruption, supra note 55, art. 21.
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Europe,96 the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”),97 and other
international organizations that aim to “promote and strengthen measures
to prevent and combat corruption [in all its forms] more efficiently and
effectively.”98 These organizations actively encourage their members to
adopt criminal legislation that penalizes private bribery, and their efforts
have produced encouraging results.99 Many European countries, as well as
China, Russia, and other members of these international organizations,
have enacted domestic private bribery legislation100 in apparent recogni-
tion that “both public morals and the public order [are] jeopardized by this
type of bribery.”101
Transnational private bribery is perhaps the bribery facet most ne-
glected by national and subnational legislatures. In crafting and enforcing
private bribery criminal legislation, most countries adhere to the standard
principle of territoriality and establish jurisdiction when the bribery-re-
lated conduct transpires within their territories.102 This approach leads
countries to focus on domestic private bribery violations to the exclusion
of private bribery conduct with international aspects.103 Countries encoun-
ter prosecutorial difficulties if their citizens perpetrate private bribery
overseas in private commercial transactions, for murky questions of extra-
territoriality arise, and countries hesitate to extend their national jurisdic-
tion.104 As a result, “in foreign business transactions [the prosecutorial]
practice seems to follow the maxim: ‘When in Rome, do as the Romans
do.’”105
96. See Council of Europe Convention, supra note 47, arts. 7–8 (prohibiting private
bribery in its passive and active forms).
97. In 1999, the ICC published its rules of conduct that include provisions that prohibit
private bribery. See ICC, COMBATING EXTORTION AND BRIBERY: ICC RULES OF CONDUCT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3, 5–6 (2005), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/Advocacy-Codes-
and-Rules/Document-centre/2004/ICC-Rules-of-Conduct-and-Recommendations-to-Combat
-Extortion-and-Bribery-%282005-Edition%29/.
98. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 55, art. 1.
99. See Ryan J. Rohlfsen, Recent Developments in Foreign and Domestic Criminal
Commercial Bribery Laws, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 151, 153–57 (2012) (discussing interna-
tional conventions and positions regarding private bribery).
100. See CMS LEGAL SERVICES, ANTI-BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION LAWS: AN INTERNA-
TIONAL GUIDE 15, 23, 26, 32 (2011), available at http://www.cms-cmck.com/Hubbard.File
System/files/Publication/e3ca4c34-f31c-4e69-9ca9-01000b628b26/Presentation/Publication
Attachment/2e7a1cc4-22b6-4327-b4c0-0434b2ea7417/Anti-bribery%20and%20corruption%
20laws%20guide.pdf (noting the presence of private bribery legislation in Russia, China, the
United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, among other countries).
101. Tak, supra note 58, at 281.
102. See Huber, supra note 4, at 584–85 (explaining principles of territoriality).
103. See Heine, supra note 14, at 625 (“International matters relating to private bribery
crimes seem to be a new subject for most countries.”). Reports suggest government officials
ignore private bribery offenses with international aspects, often not reporting them for prose-
cution. See id. at 625.
104. Cf. id. at 625–27 (describing the growing recognition of jurisdiction over nationals,
wherever they commit a crime).
105. Id. at 627.
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The recent passage of the 2010 Bribery Act (the “U.K. Bribery Act”)
promises  more aggressive global enactment and enforcement of private
bribery legislation. The United Kingdom enacted the Bribery Act (“the
Act”), arguably the most comprehensive piece of anti-bribery legislation
in the world, and the legislation criminalizes a broad range of corruption,
including domestic and transnational private bribery.106 The Act features
an extraterritorial provision that extends the statute’s jurisdictional reach
to all British citizens and residents, and all business entities “incorporated
under the law of any part of the United Kingdom,” regardless of whether
the improper conduct at issue has any territorial connection to the United
Kingdom107 Thus, if U.K. citizens or business entities with sufficient con-
nections to the United Kingdom engage in private bribery abroad, they
could face prosecution in the United Kingdom under the Bribery Act.
II. DISMANTLING THE CLASSIC DISTINCTION BETWEEN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE BRIBERY
The fundamental conceptual difference between public and private
bribery lies in the identity of the bribery recipient, with the former featur-
ing a public official and the latter a private sector agent. The public offi-
cial’s presence in the bribery scheme directly exposes the state to various
“corrupting, public-trust eroding effects,”108 and the offense commands
near universal concern and remedial action from governments worldwide
as a consequence. Conversely, traditional understandings of private brib-
ery highlight the absence of a direct connection to the public sector.109
Conventional views deem this offense as “less serious” and less deserving
of governmental intervention than public bribery,110 given its reception as
an offense that extends its reach only into the business community.111
Reinforcing this classic distinction, legislative and judicial bodies
largely address the two forms of bribery as separate and independent
wrongdoings, with some jurisdictions only regulating public bribery, and
others treating the two as isolated and distinct crimes.112 Legislatures that
criminalize private bribery generally assign a weaker set of penalties for
106. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 1 (U.K.).
107. Id., c. 23, §§ 12(4)–(5). Accord Andrew S. Boutros & T. Markus Funk, “Carbon
Copy” Prosecutions: A Growing Anticorruption Phenomenon in a Shrinking World, 2012 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 259, 271 n.50 (2012) (noting the extraterritorial reach of U.K. Bribery Act).
108. United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303, 309 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitteed).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir. 1978) (“[Private brib-
ery] denotes violation of a trust or duty—but of a private rather than a public nature.”)
(citation omitted).
110. See infra note 115 and accompanying text; United States v. Michael, 456 F. Supp.
335, 347 (D. N.J. 1978) (“It appears that the New York Legislature has confined its view of
bribery as a serious crime to only those cases involving bribery of a public official . . . .”).
111. See Albin Eser, Preface to PRIVATE COMMERCIAL BRIBERY, supra note 4, at vii, vii
(noting the conventional view that private bribery merely threatens the commercial sector).
112. See supra Parts I.B–C.
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this offense than for public bribery.113 Some governments leave their anti-
private bribery legislation outside of their penal codes, instead placing the
legislation in labor or commercial codes, where such legislation lies ig-
nored.114 The actions of the Louisiana legislature represent the traditional
approach adopted by many national legislatures toward the public-private
bribery divide.
Louisiana distinguished between bribery of its public officials and
commercial bribery: the public bribery statute has a five year,
$1000 fine maximum punishment whereas commercial bribery has
only a six month, $500 fine maximum punishment. It is obvious
that the legislature considered bribery of public officials to be
much more serious. . . . In other words, bribery of Louisiana pub-
lic officials is very serious because it affects their government,
commercial bribery is somewhat less serious but it affects the
economy of the state . . . .115
Existing legal scholarship buttresses the distinction between public
and private bribery, but the bulk of this scholarship neither critically ex-
amines the conceptual links that connect these two forms of bribery nor
analyzes the substantive justifications for treating them as separate of-
fenses.116 The interrelated nature of public and private bribery remains
underexplored. This Part analyzes the conceptual similarities between
public and private bribery, the commonalities in the harms generated by
both offenses, and the substantive morphing of the two offenses world-
wide from the effects of privatization.
113. See, e.g., Michael, 456 F. Supp. at 347 (“Under the statutory mechanism prevailing
in New York—commercial bribery is a misdemeanor subject to not more than 3 months’
imprisonment while bribery of a public official is punishable by up to 7 years’ imprison-
ment. . . .”); Bonifassi, supra note 17, at 101 (comparing the “mild sanctions” for private
bribery violations to the harsher penalties for public bribery); Michael Uberhofen, Germany,
in PRIVATE COMMERCIAL BRIBERY, supra note 4, at 115, 120 (“Although the bribery of pub-
lic officials has been a codified criminal offense for centuries and was included as a crime in
the Criminal Code (StGB) of 1871, bribery in the private sector in Germany has been, and
still is, only minimally penalized.”).
114. See, e.g., Bonifassi, supra note 17, at 91 (describing the decision of the French gov-
ernment to move its private bribery legislation from its Criminal Code to its Labor Code,
where it effectively has been “thrust aside” and ignored); Saito, supra note 17, at 195-96
(explaining that Japan’s private bribery prohibitions are located in its Code of Commerce,
not its Penal Code).
115. United States v. Tonry, 837 F.2d 1281, 1284 (5th Cir. 1988).
116. See Need for Legislation, supra note 60, at 599 (differentiating between public and
private bribery); Note, Control of Nongovernmental Corruption by Criminal Legislation, 108
U. PA. L. REV. 848, 848 (1960) (same). Private bribery itself continues to be under-examined
in legal scholarship. See David Mills & Robert Weisberg, Corrupting the Harm Requirement
in White Collar Crime, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1406 (2008) (describing commercial bribery as
a “fascinatingly under-explored area”).
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A. Public and Private Bribery Embody Parallel Conceptual Features
By separating bribery in the public and commercial arenas into two
independent crimes, modern criminal jurisprudence treats the two mani-
festations of bribery as discrete and unconnected offense categories. Such
treatment emphasizes the differences and ignores the substantive com-
monalities between the two types of bribery and leads to different treat-
ment in the criminal justice system. The underlying acts that constitute
both crimes arguably function as the congruent halves of bribery that pro-
duce a coherent conceptual whole. Both crimes derive from the same cor-
rupt foundation and feature parallel, central duty-violation and breach-of-
trust elements.
1. Public and Private Bribery Are Twin Manifestations of Corruption
Whether in the public or private sector, bribery agreements constitute
fundamentally corrupt arrangements.117 This concept of corruption estab-
lishes the foundation for both bribery forms, for “[b]ribery is regarded as
active corruption.”118 Corruption is “the act of doing something with an
intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights
of others; [or] a fiduciary’s or official’s use of a station or office to procure
some benefit either personally or for someone else, contrary to the rights
of others.”119 Public and private bribery at their core epitomize this stan-
dard definition of corruption. They both feature a briber giving a benefit
to an agent (of a public or private entity) in return for that agent showing
favor to the briber.120 This suspect agreement between the parties induces
agents to misuse their position for self-enrichment, the classic marker of
corruption.121
The nature of corruption shared by public and private bribery is the
“selling of what our society deems not to be legitimately for sale,” whether
it be, for instance, a politician’s vote, in the instance of public bribery, or a
purchasing manager’s actions on behalf of his or her employer, in the in-
117. See 1976–1977 VA. ATT’Y GEN. OPINION (Sept. 22, 1976), 1976 Va. AG LEXIS 96,
at *14 (“The gist of a bribe is corruption, which in the context under consideration, arises
when an improper variable is injected into the decision making process . . . .”); Boles, supra
note 53, at 144.
118. Leijonhufvud, supra note 74, at 409.
119. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 371 (8th ed. 1999). Accord Leijonhufvud, supra note
74, at 410 (“‘[C]orruption’ denotes various kinds of improper actions undertaken with the
object of influencing the decision-making processes and procedural activities of society.”);
Nye, supra note 22, at 419 (“Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of
a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary
or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding
influence.”).
120. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Rethinking Corruption: An Introduction to a Symposium
and a Few Additional Thoughts, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 237, 238
(2007) (“The essence of bribery is giving something of value to an official or agent in ex-
change for the official or agent exercising his or her authority in a manner favorable to the
party giving the payment.”).
121. See supra note 119 and surrounding text.
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stance of private bribery.122 Corruption is a central defining factor for
public and private bribes, in that its presence distinguishes public and pri-
vate bribes from legitimate business gifts and appropriate payment for ser-
vices.123 Legislatures,124 courts,125 scholars,126 and international
organizations127 acknowledge the significant role that corruption plays in
bribery agreements, but despite this plethora of voices, some continue to
justify bribery as an economically efficient ways “to get things done.”128
Such viewpoints ignore the corrupt nature of these practices and the prac-
tical harms that flow from them.129 In short, “[t]he common thread that
runs through common law and statutory formulations of [public and pri-
vate bribery] is the element of corruption.”130
2. Public and Private Bribery Are Functionally Equivalent Offenses
Beyond public and private bribery’s corrupt underpinnings lies a set of
core conceptual elements present in both offenses. The elements, fiduciary
duty and breach of trust violations, demonstrate that public and private
bribery can be viewed as virtually the same offense perpetrated in two
122. United States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir. 1978)
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, 1998 S.C., c. 34 (Can.) (cor-
ruption of foreign public officials encompasses public bribery); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
2602(A) (2012) (“A person commits bribery of a public servant or party officer if with cor-
rupt intent . . . .”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 641.3 (2013) (“Any employee who solicits, accepts, or
agrees to accept . . . anything of value . . . corruptly and without the knowledge or consent of
the employer . . . is guilty of commercial bribery.”); W. VA. CODE § 61-5A-10 (2012) (ad-
dressing “bribery and other corrupt practices”).
125. See, e.g., Man-Seok Choe v. Torres, 525 F.3d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining
that Korea’s public bribery statute mirrors the corresponding U.S. statute in that both
criminalize the corruption of public officials); In Town Hotels Ltd. P’ship. v. Marriott Int’l,
Inc., 246 F. Supp. 2d 469, 481 (S.D.W.V. 2003) (describing private bribery as corruption of
the principal-agent relationship).
126. Fenyk, supra note 71, at 18 (“Corruption in the private sector includes the offer of
a bribe to an intermediary who awards a contract.”) (emphasis omitted); Leijonhufvud, supra
note 74, at 405 (defining private bribery as “corruption in business relations”).
127. Council of Europe, Civil Law Convention on Corruption art. 2, Sept. 9, 1999,
C.E.T.S. No. 174, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/174.htm (de-
fining “corruption” as the offering, giving, requesting or accepting a bribe or any other undue
advantage).
128. Jac C. Heckelman & Benjamin Powell, Corruption and the Institutional Environ-
ment for Growth 1 (Suffolk Univ. Research Working Paper No. 2008-6, 2008), available at
http://192.138.214.118/RePEc/docs/wpaper/2008-6.pdf. Researchers Kaufmann and Wei
coined the term “efficient grease hypothesis” to describe the notion that bribery yields lower
amounts of red tape, and this hypothesis posits that bribery can boost economic efficiency
and thus regulating bribery would be counter-productive. Daniel Kaufmann & Shang-Jin
Wei, Does “Grease Money” Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce? 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. w7093, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=162974.
129. See infra Part II.B. As aptly expressed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
“[t]here can be no question but that any crime of bribery involves moral turpitude.” United
States v. Esperdy, 285 F.2d 341, 342 (2d Cir. 1961).
130. United States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912, 915 (2d Cir. 1978)
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different contexts.131 Common law and statutory formulations cast these
elements in differing terminology when defining public and private brib-
ery, but from a comparative standpoint, the elements represent a theoreti-
cal base shared by both offenses.
a. Public and Private Bribery Feature Fiduciary Duty Violations
An essential component of public and private sector bribery is the vio-
lation of a fiduciary duty of loyalty owed to the public or to the private
sector principals.132 In both bribery forms, the bribe “in essence is an at-
tempt to influence another to disregard his duty while continuing to ap-
pear devoted to it or to repay trust with disloyalty.”133 Under the lens of
this primary characteristic, the sole difference between the two bribery
forms is the identity of the fiduciary duty beneficiary.
Public agents owe fiduciary duties of loyalty to the public to make and
execute governmental decisions that serve the public’s best interest.134 In
democracies, the public elects its officials, and governmental entities hire
their personnel, with the understanding that these agents will act for the
common good.135 From this relationship emerges a political contract,
where the public agent works to benefit the public, and the public com-
pensates the agent in return.136 Whenever a third party bribes a public
agent, that agent violates fiduciary duties of loyalty arising from the politi-
cal contract he or she formed with the public.137 The facilitating third
party briber correspondingly seeks to benefit by influencing the public
agent to breach the fiduciary duties.138
Fiduciary duty violations also form the crux of private bribery agree-
ments.139 Employees and other agents in the private sector owe their prin-
131. See id. (explaining that public and private bribery offenses entail fiduciary duty
and breach of trust violations).
132. See United States v. Rooney, 37 F.3d 847, 852 (2d Cir. 1994) (the essence of public
sector bribery is a breach of fiduciary duty owed to the public); United States v. Walgren, 885
F.2d 1417, 1422 (9th Cir. 1989) (relaying notion that “if an employee of the State accepts
bribes, he violates his duty of loyalty to the people of the State . . . .”) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted); CITY OF OAKLAND, ETHICS RESOURCE GUIDE 18 (2013),
available at http://www2.oaklandnet.com/oakca1/groups/cityadministrator/documents/web
content/oak023337.pdf (“Public officials have a duty of loyalty to their constituents.”).
133. Esperdy, 285 F.2d 341, 342 (2d Cir. 1961).
134. United States v. Langford, 647 F.3d 1309, 1321 (11th Cir. 2001).
135. Id. (quoting United States v. deVegter, 198 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 1999)).
136. See id.
137. See id.; United States v. Jacobs, 431 F.2d 754, 759 (2d Cir. 1970) (“[T]he evil sought
to be prevented by the deterrent effect of [the bribery statute] is the aftermath suffered by
the public when an official is corrupted and thereby perfidiously fails to perform his public
service and duty.”).
138. United States v. Alfisi, 308 F.3d 144, 155 (2d Cir. 2002).
139. See Bribery in Commercial Relationships, supra note 73, at 1249 n.10 (“The breach
of fiduciary duty has been considered the foundation of the [private bribery] offense.”);
United States v. Parise, 159 F.3d 790, 805 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he core of the offense is the
breach of an agent’s duty of loyalty.”).
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cipals a fiduciary duty of loyalty that requires the agents to act in their
principals’ best interests by putting the principals’ interests above all
others in matters connected to the agency relationship.140 This affirmative
duty arises by virtue of the principal-agency relationship,141 and virtually
all employment agreements encompass the duty as an implied contractual
condition.142 If private sector agents accept bribes from third parties when
performing their workplace obligations, they violate this duty of loyalty.143
Agents do not demonstrate undivided loyalty to their principals if the
agents solicit or receive bribes in exchange for acting on their bribers’ be-
half when conducting their principals’ affairs.144 By accepting bribes,
agents further their own interests at their principals’ expense, in automatic
violation of their fiduciary duty.145 Indeed, legislatures criminalize private
bribery “on the theoretical premise that such acts represent a violation of
the duty of loyalty that an employee owes to an employer.”146
Public and private bribery’s theoretical connections to fiduciary duty
violations, and, more broadly, agency law, derive from Roman law, which
held that a person charged with official duties must not implement them in
exchange for receiving benefits from third parties.147 Under contemporary
formulations, public and private sector bribes uniformly violate fiduciary
duties of loyalty. The source of differentiation between the two bribery
forms merely lies with the classification of the principal, in that public and
private sector bribery recipients owe their duties to public and private en-
tities, respectively.
b. Public and Private Bribery Implicate Betrayals of Trust
Alternative conceptualizations of public and private bribery cast the
offenses as the concealed abuse of a position of trust, defined as “the ex-
pectation that one will do what one is relied on to do.”148 This approach
140. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006) (stating that agent has a
fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal’s benefit); Bruce A. McGovern, Fiduciary Du-
ties, Consolidated Returns, and Fairness, 81 NEB. L. REV. 170, 179-80 (2002) (“[T]he fiduci-
ary’s duty of loyalty generally requires the fiduciary to act in the best interests of the
beneficiary and to put the beneficiary’s interests above the interests of all other parties, in-
cluding those of the fiduciary.”).
141. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing the duty of loyalty held by agents in the private
sector).
142. See Need for Legislation, supra note 60, at 603.
143. See supra Part I.C.1.
144. See Parise, 159 F.3d at 800.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 799–800. Accord CMS LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 100, at 8, 13, 34 (refer-
encing fiduciary duty violation within Albanian, Slovakian and Swiss private bribery laws).
147. See Saito, supra note 17, at 197; NOONAN, supra note 25, at 52 (describing Cicero’s
views that “the foulest of acts was taking money for something judged.”).
148. NOONAN, supra note 25, at 704. Accord United States v. Duvall, 846 F.2d 966, 972
(5th Cir. 1988) (defining a bribe as “money or favor bestowed on or promised to a person in a
position of trust to pervert his judgment or influence his conduct; [it is] something that serves
to induce or influence.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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views both forms of bribery as undermining the integrity of those placed in
positions of trust, given that such individuals betray trusts that are be-
stowed upon them when they accept bribes.149 The Council of Europe
Convention relays the approach’s underlying premise, that interpersonal
trust is “necessary for the maintenance and development of social and eco-
nomic relations” in the public and private sectors.150 Under this viewpoint,
bribery prohibitions safeguard the integrity of relationships by deterring
individuals from participating in bribery and thereby protecting estab-
lished bonds of trust.
The conception of bribery as a breach of trust emanates from multiple
international sources151 and connects to the notion of bribery as fiduciary
duty, in that the bribery recipient, by accepting a bribe, simultaneously
breaches a fiduciary duty and violates garnered trust. The bribery as a
breach of trust approach treats public and private bribery as essentially
equivalent offenses, with recipients of public and private bribes abusing
their positions of public and private trusts, respectively.152
A seemingly universal tenet of democratic governance posits that the
public imparts its trust to its elected officials and other government em-
ployees and agents to carry out their duties in the public’s best interest.153
If government agents accept bribes, they violate the trust bestowed upon
them and defraud the public of their honest services.154 Their conduct
damages the public’s trust and confidence in government actors and insti-
tutions,155 harming the social fabric. As Judge Noonan explains:
149. See NOONAN, supra note 25, at 704 (explaining the notion that bribery is “always a
betrayal of trust.”).
150. COUNCIL OF EUR., CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTION ON CORRUPTION EXPLANATORY
REPORT art. 7 (1998) [hereinafter COUNCIL OF EUROPE EXPLANATORY REPORT], available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/173.htm.
151. See, e.g., text accompanying note 148; G.R. Sullivan, England and Wales, in PRI-
VATE COMMERCIAL BRIBERY, supra note 4, at 55, 65 (noting that under U.K. law, the essence
of bribery is “the clandestine abuse of a position of trust”); R. v Boston (1923) 33 CLR 386
(Austl.), (explaining that all bribery cases addressed by the High Court of Australia “rest on
the violation of a public trust.”); Queen v Nua, [2001] 3 NZLR 483 (CA) (describing bribery
as a “gross breach of trust”).
152. See United States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir. 1978) (distinguishing public
and private bribery as involving respective violations of public and private trusts).
153. See, e.g., United States v. Snook, 366 F.3d 439, 450 (7th Cir. 2004) (government
agents and employees hold positions of trust with the public); Granting Immunity From Pros-
ecution to Givers of Bribes and Other Gifts and to Their Accomplices in Briberty and Other
Graft Cases Against Public Officers, PRES. DEC. NO. 749 (July 18, 1975) (Phil.), available at
http://www.worldlii.org/ph/legis/pres_decree/pdn749181/pdn749181.html (“Whereas, public
office is a public trust: public officers are but servants of the people, whom they must serve
with utmost fidelity and integrity”); Boston, 33 CLR 386 (Austl.) (“[E]very member elected
by the people undertakes, and has imposeatd upon him, a public duty and a public trust.”)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. United States v. deVegter, 198 F.3d 1324, 1328 n.4 (11th Cir. 1999).
155. See, e.g., Saito, supra note 17, at 197.
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The social injury inflicted by breaches of trust goes beyond any
material measurement. When government officials act to enrich
themselves they act against the fabric on which they depend, for
what else does government rest upon except the expectation that
those chosen to act for the public welfare will serve that welfare?
The trust comes with the office.156
Given the importance of maintaining confidence in the public sector,
governments criminalize public bribery in part to promote the honesty of
public officials and promote the public’s trust and confidence in
government.157
Individuals and business entities similarly place their trust in the
agents whom they select to manage their affairs and act on their behalf in
the private sector. Principal-agent engagements create “relationships of
trust” that, in the aggregate, foster transparency and assurance in national
and global marketplace operations.158 When private sector agents accept
bribes in the course of administering their responsibilities, they betray the
trust expected of them.159 Such betrayal weakens principals’ dependence
in their agents and decreases the levels of integrity in business transac-
tions.160 In addition, public confidence in the viability of the commercial
sector erodes when private bribery arrangements are brought to light.161
Mindful of these public and private sector dangers, countries that maintain
criminal laws penalizing private bribery do so in order to protect “the trust
between an employer and his employees.”162
By violating interpersonal trust, public and private bribery deplete an
essential ingredient for a stable, functioning society. Social psychological
research findings demonstrate that trust is necessary to create and main-
tain healthy relationships as it strengthens cooperation within and among
156. NOONAN, supra note 25, at 704.
157. See Randy J. Curato et al., Government Fraud, Waste and Abuse: A Practical
Guide to Fighting Official Corruption, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1089 (1983).
158. Niagra Mohawk Power Corp. v. Freed, 288 A.D.2d 818, 830 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
159. See Huber, supra note 4, at 579 (“The employee, partner, or managing director
who accepts a bribe to act or refrain from acting in a manner that is contrary to his principal’s
interest betrays the trust and loyalty expected of him based upon the contract between
them.”).
160. See Byung-Sun Cho, Korea, in PRIVATE COMMERCIAL BRIBERY, supra note 4, at
231, 244 (relaying the majority view adopted by the Korean Supreme Court that private
bribery prohibitions protect “the legal interest [of]. . . integrity in commercial transactions.”).
161. See Dale A. Oesterle, Limits on a Corporation’s Protection of its Directors and
Officers from Personal Liability, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 513, 514 n.4 (1983) (discussing a severe
erosion of public confidence in the private sector after the widespread disclosure of commer-
cial bribery and questionable political contributions in the 1970s).
162. Bonifassi, supra note 17, at 92 (describing purpose of private bribery prohibitions
in France). Accord Tak, supra note 58, at 284 (Dutch law criminalizes private bribery to
safeguard the trust between employers and employees); State v. Cohen, No. 1 CA-CR 97-
0707, 1999 Ariz. App. LEXIS 49, at *13 n.4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 1999) (Washington State
private bribery statute penalizes the conferring of a benefit “upon an employee with the
understanding that the employee will violate a duty of . . . trust owed to the employer.”).
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groups and promotes stability across social networks.163 A bribery agree-
ment yields pernicious effects upon trust maintenance; it decreases the ex-
pectations, predictability, and confidence in agents’ behavior. The secrecy
and deception inherent in public and private bribery arrangements partic-
ularly enable the breaches of trust and the agents’ disloyalty to remain
unnoticed.164 When one views an act of bribery as a breach of trust, any
differences between public and private bribery become immaterial, as the
underlying nature of the trust violation remains unchanged whether it
transpires in the public or private bribery context.165
B. Public and Private Bribery Jointly Harm Public and Private
Sector Interests
Worldwide awareness of public bribery and its attendant harms gener-
ally remains strong. The OECD crisply summarizes public bribery’s harms
to the public and private sectors, noting that the offense “is a widespread
phenomenon in international business transactions, including trade and in-
vestment, which raises serious moral and political concerns, undermines
good governance and economic development, and distorts international
competitive conditions.”166 The global citizen largely understands the dan-
gers inherent in bribing domestic public officials,167 and international con-
sciousness of foreign public bribery and its harms continues to grow.168
Conversely, the general public is less familiar with private bribery and
its damaging effects.169 A growing body of research reveals how private
163. See generally Daniel Balliet & Paul A. M. Van Lange, Trust, Conflict, and Cooper-
ation: A Meta-Analysis, PSYCHOL. BULLETIN (Dec. 10, 2002), available at http://
www.academia.edu/2033226/Trust_Conflict_and_Cooperation_A_Meta-analysis.
164. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 150, ¶ 55 (noting
that secrecy is “the essence of the [private bribery] offence” and that it “threatens the inter-
ests of the private sector entity and makes it dangerous”); United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d
304, 309 (7th Cir. 1987) (observing that “no public official in the United States takes bribes
openly”); Sirkin v. Fourteenth Street Store, 124 A.D. 384, 391 (N.Y. App. Div. 1908) (“The
vice [of private bribery] lies in making the agreement without the knowledge of the
master.”).
165. Cf. United States v. Forsythe, 429 F. Supp. 715, 721 n.5 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (noting the
violations of trust inherent in public and private bribery offenses).
166. OECD CONVENTION, supra note 46, at 6. See also supra Part I.B (explaining how
public bribery harms the public and private sector).
167. See, e.g., OECD, TURKEY: PHASE 2 REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE CON-
VENTION ON COMBATTING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUS-
INESS TRANSACTIONS 10 (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/anti-bribery/
anti-briberyconvention/39862163.pdf (noting widespread public awareness of domestic brib-
ery in Turkey); UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, CORRUPTION IN AFGHANI-
STAN: RECENT PATTERNS AND TRENDS 3 (2012), available at http://info.publicintelligence.net/
UNODC-AfghanCorruption.pdf (population survey report detailing how the vast majority of
the Afghan population experiences harms attendant to public bribery).
168. See Fighting Foreign Bribery: An Initiative to Raise Awareness, OECD 3–4 (2010),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/45791299.pdf (last visited Apr.
10, 2014) (detailing increasing awareness of foreign public bribery).
169. See C. Gopinath, Recognizing and Justifying Private Corruption, 82 J. BUS. ETHICS
747, 749 (2008) (discussing public awareness of private bribery); Keith E. Henderson &
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bribery offenses harm a broad spectrum of public and private sector inter-
ests,170 but a number of policy makers, legal scholars, and business people
worldwide appear to misunderstand grossly the nature of these harmful
effects.171 Because public sector agents cannot engage in private bribery
by definition, many apparently reach the conclusion that private bribery
does not harm the public sector. Such misunderstandings contribute to an
assumption that private bribery is considerably less serious than public
bribery, and reinforce the impulse to treat the two bribery forms as sepa-
rate and distinct offenses, with attention and enforcement action devoted
towards thwarting only public bribery.172
The traditional view of private bribery’s harms, widely held interna-
tionally, posits that the offense only threatens the private sector, and in
particular, private sector employers.173 Criticisms leveled by a set of Swiss
right-wing political parties concerning certain Swiss private bribery crimi-
nal statutes exemplify the traditional view, for these parties have argued
that private bribery “is not a danger to everyone, but only to major com-
panies, which can defend themselves.”174 Various private bribery discus-
sions in legal scholarship allude to the offense’s supposed lack of harm to
the public sector and perpetuate the traditional view.175 This view fails to
recognize the ways in which private bribery simultaneously harms a range
of public and private sector interests176 and reinforces an overall “what’s
Karen A. Guida, United States, in PRIVATE COMMERCIAL BRIBERY, supra note 4, at 479, 552
(“[T]here [is] a dearth of information related to private bribery as opposed to public
bribery.”).
170. See Boles, supra note 53, at 153-58 (explaining harmful effects of private bribery);
Gevurtz, supra note 8, at 373–87 (same); Bribery in Commercial Relationships, supra note 73,
at 1248 (same).
171. See, e.g., D.E. Ytreberg, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statutes Punish-
ing Commercial Bribery, 1 A.L.R. 3d 1350 §3(b) (2010) (describing viewpoint that private
bribery statutes are “not needed to protect the health, morals, or welfare of the public”);
Christopher R. Yukins, Integrating Integrity and Procurement: The United Nations Conven-
tion against Corruption and the UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law, 36 PUB. CONT. L. J.
307, 323–24 (2007) (criticizing the U.N. Convention against Corruption for encouraging its
member states to adopt laws that prohibit private bribery).
172. See John P. Woods, Civil Forfeiture as a Remedy for Corruption in Public and
Private Contracting in New York, 75 ALB. L. REV. 931, 961 (2011) (relaying that the public
interest in deterring private bribery is not as strong as it is in deterring public bribery); Eser,
supra note 111, at vii (enforcement of private bribery violations lags significantly behind that
of public bribery violations).
173. See Eser, supra note 111, at vii (detailing the traditional view that private bribery is
simply a form of disloyalty to one’s employer).
174. Karl-Ludwig Kunz, Nadja Capus & Philipp Keller, Switzerland, in PRIVATE COM-
MERCIAL BRIBERY, supra note 4, at 435, 471.
175. See Evan Tsen Lee, Cancelling Crime, 30 CONN. L. REV. 117, 136 n.55 (1997)
(“Commercial bribery, of course, does not involve the public trust.”).
176. Through bribing a company’s agent, the briber effectively shuts out its competitors
from consideration by the bribed agent’s company, thereby creating anti-competitive effects.
The bribed agent’s company may likely pay for the cost of the bribe through inflated con-
tracts with the briber. See supra Part I.C. For these reasons, the offense “poses an obvious
risk to free markets” domestically and internationally. Searby, supra note 13, at 2 (“If you
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the big deal?” attitude towards the offense.177 Fox Sports Australia com-
mentator Andy Harper described this attitude when he opined on private
bribery allegations faced by FIFA leadership: “people sort of shrug their
shoulders and well, you know, in some cases that’s the way business is
done.”178
Recent scholarship documents how the traditional view is demonstra-
bly incorrect, as the research highlights how the crime’s anticompetitive
effects distort the functioning of economies, boost prices, and lower the
quality of goods and services for consumers.179 Private bribery threatens
free and unrestrained competition, the effective functioning of local, na-
tional and international trade, the integrity of labor relations, and the pro-
tection of free competition.180 Hence, “the public moral and public order
regarding commercial transactions [are] at stake in cases of [private] brib-
ery.”181 The traditional view that private bribery only impacts businesses
rests on false assumptions, for the public is the ultimate victim in this
offense.182
C. The Merging of Public and Private Bribery Boundaries in Domestic
and International Markets through Privatization
Conceptual similarities aside, the boundaries of public and private
bribery are merging as a result of the international privatization move-
ment. The movement involves the transfer of functions from the public to
the private sectors, and is reconfiguring government at all levels. Codifying
public and private bribery as two discrete and distinct offenses clashes
with the privatization movement in its shifting of governmental functions
to the private sector.
1. Privatization Is Internationally Omnipresent
Privatization describes an international movement designed to shift
ownership of assets and services from the state to the private sector.183
can bribe your customer’s purchasing manager, you may succeed without having the lowest
price or the best product.”).
177. See Peter Williams, The Only Way Is Ethics, THE TREASURER, Oct. 2011, at 37,
available at www.treasurers.org/system/files/Oct11TTethics36-38.pdf (describing the view-
point that bribery is just “part of doing business”).
178. Ashley Hall, Bribery Revelations ‘No Surprise’ to Soccer Fans, AUSTRALIAN
BROAD. CORP. (July 12, 2012, 12:42 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2012/
s3544281.htm (discussing private bribery allegations surrounding leaders of the International
Federation of Association Football).
179. See supra Part I.C.1.
180. See supra Part I.C.1.
181. Cho, supra note 160, at 244.
182. See id.
183. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a New Adminis-
trative Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687, 1690 (2002). See also Lawrence Azubuike, Privatization
and Foreign Investments in Nigeria, 13 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 59, 63 (2005) (“Privatiza-
tion is essentially the withdrawal of the government from active and direct participation in
the affairs of an enterprise, which it hitherto owned.”).
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The term is synonymous with private-sector outsourcing, “the use of the
private sector in the provision of a good or service, the components of
which include financing, operations (supplying, production, delivery), and
quality control.”184 Privatization encompasses a number of different
forms, including a government’s departure from an activity area or from
the provision of certain services to the public.185 One of its most prevalent
models involves the use of private sector entities “to implement govern-
ment programs or to provide services to others on the government’s be-
half.”186 Governments implement privatization programs by contracting,
leasing, selling, franchising, and vouchering government-held assets to pri-
vate entities; commercializing government departments; terminating ser-
vices; and deregulating industry segments to permit private entities to
produce and deliver goods and services to the public, among other meth-
ods.187 Telecommunication networks and facilities, garbage collection,
fire-fighting services, public utilities, military support services, airports,
highways, air traffic control systems, and other public infrastructure seg-
ments are frequent targets for sweeping privatization efforts around the
world.188
Privatization efforts aim to downsize governmental functions by plac-
ing “traditionally public decisions into the hands of the private sector.”189
Many conservative policymakers, academics, and public intellectuals pro-
mote privatization efforts as a technique to shrink the size of government,
reap cost savings, and provide the public with the same goods and services
more efficiently,190 under the assumption that the marketplace operates
184. Matthew Titolo, Privatization and the Market Frame, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 493, 493–94
(2012) (citiation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
185. Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1370
(2003). See also Matthew Diller, Introduction: Redefining the Public Sector: Accountability
and Democracy in the Era of Privatization, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1307, 1389 (2001)
(describing the strands of privatization to include “contracting out the delivery of services,
divestiture of government owned resources and institutions, the establishment of private
communities with quasi-governmental powers, the creation of voucher programs to replace
the direct delivery of services, [and] the movement toward incentive-based or private forms
of regulation . . . .”).
186. Metzger, supra note 185, at 1370.
187. Richard W. Bauman, Foreword, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2 (2000); Diller,
supra note 185, at 1308; Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms through Privatization,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1287 (2003).
188. See Bauman, supra note 187, at 9 (listing segments of public infrastructure fre-
quently targeted for privatization); Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of
Privatized Welfare, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 598 (2001) (same).
189. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented Perspective on the
Public/Private Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 769, 774
(1998). Professor Aman explains that the purpose of privatization “is to return decision-mak-
ing back to the private sector, where private ordering and a market economy, coupled with
clear property rights and effective criminal law enforcement, will supply the structure, order,
stability, and rules needed for the economy to prosper.” Id. at 803.
190. Freeman, supra note 187, at 1291–92; Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions,
77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 718–19 (2010).
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more efficiently than the government.191 Thus, privatization’s principal
lure “is the lure of market competition—and the concomitant belief that
private firms can provide goods and services better, faster, and cheaper
than the government.”192
Privatization programs are flourishing internationally,193 with many
governments operating under the premise that the private sector should
conduct as much public business as possible.194 As the World Bank notes,
“[i]t is hard to find a country without a privatization program, or a sector
of activity not susceptible to private management if not ownership.”195
Supporters tout the movement as a method for developing national mar-
kets and facilitating economic growth.196 For instance, the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank actively encourage developing coun-
tries to employ privatization methods,197 as such methods purportedly
strengthen national economies by attracting foreign capital and promoting
foreign investment.198
The process of “reinventing government as leaner and meaner”
through privatization has effectively expanded the scope of private sector
activity across the world.199 Implementing this privatization process in
turn has blurred the boundaries of the public and private sectors. A funda-
mental tenet of many legal systems casts the public and private sectors into
distinct spheres, with different constitutional constraints applied to each,
191. Titolo, supra note 184, at 494.
192. Michaels, supra note 190, at 725 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Despite its purported benefits, privatization has attracted heavy criticism due to its
harmful effects. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, The Changing Shape of Government, 28 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 1319, 1320 (2001) [hereinafter, Changing Shape of Government] (criticizing
privatization efforts for “diminishing . . . transparency, diminishing . . . opportunities for
public participation, and, in particular, . . . diminishing . . . information flows that make public
participation meaningful”); Michaels, supra note 190, at 718 (discussing how “the excessive
delegation of sovereign authority pav[es] the way for private contractors to abuse their dis-
cretion, evade oversight, and generate unanticipated cost overruns”).
193. See Bauman, supra note 187, at 1 (describing international privatization move-
ments as transformational in their impact); Azubuike, supra note 183, at 60 (“[P]rivatization
is part of the overall restructuring of the political and economic lives of many nations; from
communism to market economies, from dictatorship to democracy, and, in the case of devel-
oping countries, from neo-colonialism to an attempt at true independence.”).
194. Titolo, supra note 184, at 525. Accord Michaels, supra note 190, at 725 (“[P]rivate
contractors are assuming ever larger and ever more sensitive roles in carrying out public
functions, all ostensibly in the name of efficiency and good governance.”).
195. Sunita Kikeri, John Nellis & Mary Shirley, Outreach #3: Policy Views from the
Country Economics Department, WORLD BANK (July, 1992), http://www.worldbank.org/html/
prddr/outreach/or3.htm.
196. See Stavros Gadinis, Can Company Disclosures Discipline State-Appointed Manag-
ers? Evidence from Greek Privatizations, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 525, 527 (2012)
(discussing privatization as a method for developing national markets).
197. See Bauman, supra note 187, at 7; Jeffrey Davis et al., Fiscal and Macroeconomic
Impact, INT’L MONETARY FUND (2000), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/nft/op/194/.
198. See Azubuike, supra note 183, at 68.
199. Michaels, supra note 190, at 718 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see Azubuike, supra note 183, at 64.
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and with a clear demarcating line of separation.200 Privatization morphs
this traditional border by embedding private entities in governance, caus-
ing “the boundaries between the public and private sectors [to] become
pervasively blurred.”201 By delegating governmental power to the private
sector, privatization has blended together public and private power at
every level of government, redefining the nature of public and private in
contemporary society.202
As a result of privatization, private entities now exercise public power
throughout the world and supplant many functions of local and national
government.203 For instance, private entities “provide a vast array of social
services for the government; administer core aspects of government pro-
grams; and perform tasks that appear quintessentially governmental, such
as promulgating standards or regulating third-party activities.”204 Current
trends show the private sector’s role in the public sphere increasing, with
governments delegating broader responsibilities and increasing discretion
to private entities, in a variety of divisions, including public education,
prison, and health care and welfare systems.205 In short, the worldwide
popularity of privatization has expanded the gray area between the public
and private sectors, creating an “extensive intermixing of public and
private.”206
2. Privatization Obfuscates Public and Private Bribery Classifications
As privatization fogs any clear divide between the public and private
spheres, the movement has caused difficulties in distinguishing between
public sector and private sector actors.207 When private actors perform
public functions, traditional distinctions between public and private erode,
200. See Metzger, supra note 185, at 1370.
201. Metzger, supra note 185, at 1369. Accord Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130, 163 (1967) (“Increasingly in this country, the distinctions between governmental and
private sectors are blurred.”); Memorandum on Gov’t Contracting, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 123 (Mar. 4, 2009), available at http://www.govexec.com/pdfs/030409e1.pdf (“[T]he line
between inherently governmental activities that should not be outsourced and commercial
activities that may be subject to private sector competition has been blurred and inade-
quately defined.”).
202. See Aman, supra note 183, at 1688.
203. See Diller, supra note 185, at 1311; Aman, supra note 183, at 1694 (“The delegation
of public functions to private bodies now occurs as part of a larger, global regulatory context
in which nonstate actors play an increasingly prominent role at all levels of government.”).
204. Metzger, supra note 185, at 1369.
205. See id.
206. Metzger, supra note 185, at 1369. Accord Changing Shape of Government, supra
note 192, at 1319, 1321 (discussing how privatization expands the gray area between the pub-
lic and private sectors).
207. See Metzger, supra note 185, at 1369 (discussing the lack of clear divide between
public and private sector as a result of privatization); Rohlfsen, supra note 99, at 157 (noting
the difficulties in distinguishing between public and private officials due to the effects of
privatization). For a general overview on the public-private distinction, see Paul M.
Schoenhard, A Three-Dimensional Approach to the Public-Private Distinction, 2008 UTAH L.
REV. 635 (2008) (offering a general overview on the public-private distinction).
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as “[n]ew forms of governmental activities, developing within the growing
scope of the privatization, change the reality of state actions.”208 In a Con-
sultation Paper, the OECD Working Group on Bribery highlights this is-
sue, opining that “the distinction between public sector and private sector
officials is not always clear, especially in countries where there has been
significant privatization, including in high-risk areas such as energy, tele-
communications and transport.”209 When private actors carry out public
functions as a result of privatization, can those actors be treated as public
officials? Domestic and international courts and legal scholars struggle
with adequately addressing this thorny issue in multiple areas of law.210
The conceptual ambiguity surrounding public and private actor deter-
minations translates into practical difficulties in the context of bribery law
application. When private actors accept bribes in the course of carrying
out public functions, it is unclear whether public or private bribery laws
should apply to penalize such conduct. For example, suppose a privately-
owned waste management company contracts with a municipality to pro-
vide garbage collection services to the municipality’s residents. The com-
pany needs to purchase twenty additional garbage trucks in order to
address residential growth. The company employee charged with purchas-
ing the additional trucks covertly accepts a $300,000 bribe from a waste
collection vehicle dealer, in exchange for purchasing ten of the dealer’s
trucks on behalf of the company. Unbeknownst to the company, the
dealer charges the company twice the fair market value for the trucks and
builds the cost of the bribe into the contract for the trucks. The company
ultimately passes the inflated cost of the trucks onto the municipality. If
the government learns of this bribery agreement, could it successfully
prosecute the employee for violating the public bribery statute, or should
it charge under the private bribery statute? Prosecutors and courts face a
murky legal issue; and scant judicial authority exists to guide in this
situation.
Assume for the purpose of the above hypothetical that the bribery
transpires in a jurisdiction that does not criminalize private bribery. The
prosecutor’s only apparent option would be to charge the company em-
208. Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization, 45 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 1169, 1191 (1995). Accord Christiana Ochoa, Advancing the Language of
Human Rights in a Global Economic Order: An Analysis of a Discourse, 23 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 57, 62 (2003) (“Under a globalizing order that erodes national sovereignty and
increases the importance of private actors, a clear delineation between private and public law
and their relationship to one another is difficult to discern.”).
209. OECD, CONSULTATION PAPER: REVIEW OF THE OECD INSTRUMENTS ON COM-
BATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSAC-
TIONS TEN YEARS AFTER ADOPTION 12 (2008) [hereinafter OECD REVIEW], available at
http://www.oecd.org/investment/anti-bribery/39882963.pdf. Accord Rohlfsen, supra note 99,
at 156–57 (discussing the OECD Working Group’s response to the public/private official
issue).
210. See Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the
Problem of Accountability under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135, 165–69
(2005) (providing an overview of transnational approaches to the state actor problem).
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ployee with a violation of the applicable public bribery statute. Public
bribery statutes generally require the alleged bribery recipient—the defen-
dant in the criminal action—to qualify as a “public official,” “public ser-
vant,” or another variant thereof.211 Legislatures commonly define “public
official” and synonymous terms as a variation of “any officer or employee
of government, including legislators and judges, and any person participat-
ing as juror, advisor, consultant or otherwise, in performing a governmen-
tal function.”212 Accordingly, the company employee would need to
qualify as a type of “public official” according to the applicable bribery
statute in order to be prosecuted under it. If the company employee does
not qualify as such under a court’s interpretation of the statute, the gov-
ernment would be unable to prosecute the company employee for the
bribery offense, possibly rendering the bribery recipient unaccountable for
the corrupt act.
Classifying the company employee may become even more unclear if
the employee resides under a foreign jurisdiction and the bribery is trans-
nationally based. In China and in a number of developing nations, “many
persons that appear to be private or ordinary businesspersons will qualify
as foreign officials,” and could arguably be prosecuted under public or
private transnational bribery statutes.213 Untangling the status of bribery
recipients from foreign jurisdictions in transnational private bribery cases
is essentially untested in the courts.
By bifurcating bribery into public and private offense types, legisla-
tures create this legal conundrum. As the difference between public and
private bribery largely revolves around the classification of the bribery re-
cipient, a bribery recipient with an ambiguous status creates conceptual
gray areas and practical prosecutorial hurdles. Private parties essentially
function as public officials when executing public functions as a result of
privatization efforts, but the divergent bribery statutes are ill-suited to ad-
dress such persons when they accept bribes. Privatization’s rapid growth
211. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:27-10 (West 2013) (indicating New Jersey public bribery stat-
ute applies to “public servants”). Accord Bribery of Public Servants by Persons Having Deal-
ings with Public Bodies Ordinance, (2003) Cap. 201, § 8 (H.K.); Bribery (Amendment) Act
(No. 20 of 1994), § 7 (Sri Lanka).
212. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:27-1g (West 2013).
213. Daniel Chow, The Interplay Between China’s Anti-Bribery Laws and the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1015, 1017 (2012). Ostensibly private businesspersons
could qualify as public officials under bribery statutes because many business enterprises,
whether state- or privately-owned, could qualify as state-controlled and/or active in perform-
ing governmental functions. See id. at 1024; Dominique T. Fasano, United States v. Aguilar:
District Court Attempts Clarification of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by Further Defining
“Foreign Official”, 20 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 489, 501 (2012) (noting, in the context of the
FCPA’s extraterritorial application, that the ‘foreign official definition “is stretched beyond
traditional government employees; it is now broad enough to include . . . officials who hold a
variety of private and public positions, . . . since the lines in developing nations are blurred
between privatization of state-owned enterprises and government agencies.”); Agnieszka
Klich, Bribery in Economies in Transition: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 32 STAN. J
INT’L L. 121, 122 (1996) (noting an individual’s status as either an official or non-official is
frequently unclear in the context of privatization occurring in formerly communist states).
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compounds the problem, for international organizations214 and legal
scholars recognize that increased privatization rates correspond with in-
creased opportunities for bribery.215 In short, privatization has blurred the
distinction between public and private bribery, along with its reliance on
the categorization of entities as public and non-public. As such, the classi-
cal distinction between public and private bribery no longer appears tena-
ble in a world of privatization.216
III. REFORMING TRANSNATIONAL APPROACHES TO PRIVATE BRIBERY
LEGISLATION AND ENFORCEMENT
As explored in Parts I and II of this Article, countries diverge greatly
in their approaches to public and private bribery criminalization. Many
countries outlaw the former and employ active enforcement regimes,
while essentially ignoring the latter. Moreover, those countries that
criminalize both public and private bribery follow a conventional ap-
proach that treats the bribery types as separate and distinct offenses, yet
this approach conflicts with conceptual understandings of the bribery
types and the practical realities of bribery as it transpires globally. This
Part proposes a set of comprehensive legislative reforms to improve gov-
ernmental responses to private bribery and align nations around a com-
mon standard that properly deters this offense.
A. Nations Should Criminalize Private Bribery in Its Domestic and
Transnational Forms
As previously discussed, disparities exist globally between bribery
types in rates of criminalization, penalty levels and enforcement frequen-
cies.217 Essentially all countries criminalize domestic public bribery, and
an increasing number criminalizes transnational public bribery.218 Yet
only a subset criminalizes domestic private bribery, and a tinier subset
214. See OECD REVIEW, supra note 209, at 12 (“[P]ermissiveness toward private sector
bribery could result in a business climate conducive to foreign bribery, particularly given that
the private sector in many countries is larger than the public sector, thus providing more
opportunities for corrupt dealings.”).
215. See Aaron G. Murphy, The Migratory Patterns of Business in the Global Village, 2
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 229, 239 (2005) (discussing how privatization increases opportunities for
bribery); Virginia Newell & Benedict Sheehy, Corporate Militaries and States: Actors, Interac-
tions, and Reactions, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 67, 84 n.80 (2006) (“The privatization of global water
services has resulted in huge profits [for the private corporations], higher prices for water,
cut-offs to customers who cannot pay, little transparency in their dealings, reduced water
quality, bribery, and corruption.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Elizabeth Spahn, International Bribery: The Moral Imperialism Critiques, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L.
155, 180 (2009) (“[U]nregulated privatization in the absence of developed civil society and
rule of law presented opportunities for widespread bribery and corruption that undermined
the economy and development of Russia.”).
216. See Rohlfsen, supra note 99, at 156 (noting that the privatization of formerly public
industries has blurred the distinction between private and public corruption).
217. See supra Parts I.B–C.
218. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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criminalizes transnational private bribery. Penalties and enforcement
trends also split widely between bribery types, for among countries with
enacted public and private bribery legislation, governments prosecute
public bribery offenses far more frequently than private bribery and pun-
ish the former offenses with a harsher range of penalties than the latter.219
Simply put, bribery involving public officials clearly garners more world-
wide government concern and action than does bribery involving private
sector agents.220
1. A Host of Historical Factors Have Discouraged Private
Bribery Criminalization
Many nations have refrained from proactively addressing private brib-
ery due to a number of converging factors, ranging from a lack of public
awareness to misunderstandings surrounding the nature of the offense.
First, many legislators and policymakers believe that criminal sanctions are
inappropriate for a perpetrator of private bribery, as they maintain that
the companies injured by commercial bribes should seek civil remedies or
self-regulate by taking disciplinary action against any employee who ac-
cepts bribes.221 Under this commonly held belief, “implementation of a
state’s system of prosecution for [private bribery] is unwarranted and
wasteful.”222
Second, the 1997 OECD Convention, widely viewed as “the most suc-
cessful instrument in the fight against corruption thus far,”223 has estab-
lished legally binding standards for its signatory countries to criminalize
transnational public sector bribery,224 but the Convention does not re-
quire its signatories to outlaw private bribery.225 As Parties to the Con-
vention, the 34 members of the OECD and six non-member countries
have enacted transnational public sector bribery laws or are in the process
219. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (comparing public and private bribery
enforcement trends).
220. See, e.g., Tak, supra note 58, at 280 (explaining that “Dutch criminal law tradition-
ally has been less oriented toward safeguarding contractual or private law relations than pro-
viding safeguards in the public sphere.”).
221. See Thomas O. Rose, Introduction, in PRIVATE COMMERCIAL BRIBERY, supra note
4, at 1, 3 (explaining the viewpoint that private bribery should addressed through civil law
and self-regulation); Bonifassi, supra note 17, at 108 (discussing the “strong impression that
the matter is left to the business community to police through self-regulation and internal
corporate programs.”); Yukins, supra note 171, at 324 (“[I]t is assumed that other enforce-
ment mechanisms—workplace opprobrium, or simply firing the employee—will contain
whatever threat ‘commercial bribery’ may pose.”) (emphasis in original).
222. Rose, supra note 221.
223. Huber, supra note 4, at 572.
224. OECD CONVENTION, supra note 46, at 7. The OECD explains that the Convention
“establishes an open-ended, peer-driven monitoring mechanism to ensure the thorough im-
plementation of the international obligations that countries have taken on under the Conven-
tion.” Bribery and Corruption, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibribery
convention.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2014) [hereinafter Bribery & Corruption].
225. Huber, supra note 4, at 572.
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of implementing such laws; hence the Convention has effectively facili-
tated positive change in combatting transnational public bribery.226 The
Parties share a major commercial presence, as they collectively account for
roughly 80 percent of the world’s exports and roughly 90 percent of the
worldwide outflows of foreign direct investment.227 According to Angel
Gurria, the OECD Secretary-General, the Convention “sets the highest
and toughest standards for fighting bribery in business,”228 but its failure
to address private bribery is particularly glaring. The OECD Working
Group on Bribery has opined that private bribery is outside of its mandate
and that it will defer addressing the offense until its “prohibition against
public sector bribery has been successfully implemented.”229
Third, the collective body of criminal laws in many countries tradition-
ally has been more oriented toward protecting the public sphere.230
“[P]rivate law takes as its starting point the concept of autonomy of par-
ties, which means that each contracting party is responsible for his choice
of contractual partner.”231 Many government officials analyze private
bribery under this framework. They accordingly categorize as a “matter of
the party’s own risk” the possibility that its contractual counterparty has
engaged in private bribery as part of the deal.232 This perspective essen-
tially maintains that companies assume the risk that their contractual
counterparties may have engaged in private bribery and that, as a result,
companies should diligently investigate the parties with whom they do
business before proceeding.233
Fourth, there has never been a major public outcry for governments to
address private bribery for a number of reasons. The offense in practice
most often goes undetected by the business sector and the larger commu-
nity.234 When a company learns of a specific incident of private bribery
involving one of its employees, sources suggest that the company typically
addresses the matter internally by taking disciplinary measures against the
employee.235 News of private bribery occurrences and explanations of the
226. See Bribery & Corruption, supra note 224.
227. OECD, OECD WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2012),
available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/AntiBriberyAnnRep2011.pdf.
228. Id. at 2.
229. OECD REVIEW, supra note 209, at 11. Accord Rohlfsen, supra note 99, at 156–57
(discussing the OECD Working Group’s treatment of private bribery).
230. See Tak, supra note 58, at 280. But see Part II.C (critiquing the traditional notions
of separated public and private sectors based upon advances in privatization) (emphasis in
original).
231. Tak, supra note 58, at 280 (emphasis omitted).
232. Id.
233. Inherent in this perspective are the false assumptions that private bribery is solely
a matter of private law and that any harms caused by the bribery do not extend into the
public sphere. See supra Part II.B (outlining the public sector harms caused by private
bribery).
234. See Gevurtz, supra note 8, at 365 (discussing the prevalence of private bribery).
235. Sullivan, supra note 151, at 60.
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crime’s effects rarely ever reach the public. Given this global lack of public
awareness, many governments treat private bribery with minimal attention
and expend virtually no resources in combatting it.236 There has been no
organized approach for presenting a message to the legislature, judiciary,
prosecutorial authorities, and the public that more attention and impor-
tance should be given to prosecuting private bribery.237
Fifth, as discussed in Part II.B, general misunderstandings surround
the nature of the harms caused by private bribery. Many lawmakers and
scholars believe that the offense solely harms private sector companies,238
despite the existence of a growing body of scholarship that shows how the
offense causes concrete harms to industry sectors, labor relations, all levels
of trade, and free market operations.239 While private bribery in operation
does not implicate public sector officials, consumers ultimately shoulder
the harmful effects of the crime through higher prices and lower quality
goods and services.240
2. Governments Should Criminalize Domestic and Transnational
Private Bribery
A strong need exists to align the transnational body of laws governing
private bribery. The offense currently thrives in international markets, ac-
cording to surveys of business executives. In a 2012 Deloitte survey, sev-
enty-five percent of business executive participants from multinational
companies identified private bribery as a top integrity-related risk concern
of their companies,241 and a similar survey showed over sixty percent of
polled companies relaying that they have been recently harmed by private
bribery.242 The crime causes material harm to the public and private sec-
tors, but remains essentially ignored by countries around the globe.
Sound justifications grounded in public policy warrant enacting and
expanding criminal legislation to penalize domestic and transnational pri-
vate bribery. Governments cannot rely on private civil actions and corpo-
rate self-regulation to deter the offense, for the offense’s victims expand
beyond individual companies to include industry participants and the pub-
lic sector.243 The offense threatens the public order and deserves criminal
treatment, for it causes moral and economic damage to the public and
private sectors. Given the rapid growth of privatization and globalization,
the crime’s pernicious effects harm commercial and consumer interests
236. See supra Part I.C.2.
237. See Bonifassi, supra note 17, at 109.
238. See supra Part II.B.
239. See supra Part II.B.
240. See supra Part II.B.
241. DELOITTE DEVELOPMENT LLC, LOOK BEFORE YOU LEAP: NAVIGATING RISKS IN
EMERGING MARKETS 1, 5 (2012), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-United
States/Local%20Assets/Documents/FAS_ForensicCenter_us_fas-us_dfc/us_fas_lbyl_navigat
ing_risks_in_emerging_markets_102412.pdf.
242. See Burckhardt & Borsodi, supra note 57, at 213 (discussing survey results).
243. See supra Part II.B.
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across nations.244 In order to adequately combat the crime, governments
should outlaw both domestic and transnational private bribery through the
enactment of comprehensive criminal laws.
a. Outlawing Private Bribery Serves the Public Interest
Some question the merits of outlawing bribery in the private sector,
given that such governmental action will expend public resources for a
crime that, in its commission, implicates no public officials.245 This argu-
ment fails to acknowledge how the crime injures significant public sector
interests. When private sector employees accept bribes, their fundamen-
tally corrupt actions damage the labor relationship with their employers.
The private bribery arrangement undermines the social values of trust,
confidence, and loyalty, “which are necessary for the maintenance and de-
velopment of social and economic relations.”246 Moreover, employers face
concrete financial harms when their employees accept bribes, for bribers
may surreptitiously include the cost of the bribes into any subsequent con-
tract prices with the employers.247 Even when a particular incident of pri-
vate bribery does not cause concrete economic damage to a particular
victim, the offense nevertheless harms societies through the erosion of so-
cial values.248 According to the Council of Europe, “Criminalisation of
bribery in the private sector seeks to protect the trust, the confidence and
the loyalty that are indispensable for private relationships to exist.”249
Private bribery criminalization also ensures respect for fair competi-
tion across societies.250 The private bribery arrangement gives the briber
an unfair competitive advantage by removing from consideration goods
and services offered by the briber’s competitors.251 Such action can
harshly disadvantage the briber’s industry competitors and, on a larger
scale, distort the routine functions of domestic and international mar-
kets.252 Private bribery’s anti-competitive effects eventually injure the
public in due course because consumers experience higher prices and in-
ferior quality goods and services as a result of the offense.253
244. See Heine, supra note 14, at 608 (“International and supranational instruments and
incentives seem to reveal the need for substantial improvement in the law for combating
private commercial bribery.”).
245. See supra Part II.B.
246. COUNCIL OF EUROPE EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 150, ¶ 52.
247. See supra Part I.C.1.
248. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 150, at ¶ 52.
249. Id. ¶ 55.
250. Id. ¶ 52.
251. See supra Part I.C.1.
252. See supra Part I.C.1.
253. See supra Part I.C.1.
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b. Privatization Increases the Threat of Domestic and Transnational
Private Bribery
The widespread prevalence of privatization has exacerbated the need
to criminalize domestic and transnational private bribery. Privatization
blurs the distinction between the public and private sectors, and creates
extensive opportunities for private bribery.254 The 8th International Anti-
Corruption Conference Declaration acknowledges this danger, as it posits
that “there must be a sustained campaign against corruption within the
private sector as, with greater privatisation and deregulation, it assumes a
greater role in activities traditionally performed by the state.”255 Moreo-
ver, the Council of Europe mandates private bribery criminalization on
the ground that it is “logical to protect the public from the damaging ef-
fects of corruption in businesses . . . particularly since the financial or other
powers concentrated in the private sector, necessary for their new func-
tions, are of great social importance.”256
Most countries fail to address transnational private bribery ade-
quately, as they either have ineffective or no legislation outlawing the of-
fense. The offense’s harms are becoming more transparent to the global
community, as the ICC and other international bodies recently observed
that this offense has a “growing adverse impact on world trade and eco-
nomic progress.”257 The prevalence of privatization reinforces the need
for government action to criminalize domestic and transnational private
bribery; without such action, the offense will continue to fester across
markets.
c. Nations Must Coordinate a Comprehensive Approach to Combat
Private Bribery
In order to combat private bribery adequately, a coordinated, compre-
hensive strategy is necessary among nations to criminalize and actively
prosecute private bribery involving domestic and foreign agents. The bulk
of existing criminal private bribery statutes, which outlaw the offense only
as it occurs domestically, need reform; countries that have enacted such
laws need to revise the laws to prohibit both domestic and transnational
private bribery.258 In addition, countries that have not formally addressed
254. See Aman, supra note 189, at 819 (“The public/private distinction once demarcated
two relatively separate worlds - government and the private market. Private capital markets
tended to be primarily local, and capital had little mobility. Private in this sense, however, has
long passed into history.”).
255. The Lima Declaration against Corruption, INT’L ANTI-CORRUPTION CONFERENCE
[IACC], (Sept., 1997), available at http://www.8iacc.org/lima/e-limadecl.html.
256. COUNCIL OF EUROPE EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 150, ¶ 52.
257. OECD REVIEW, supra note 209, at 11. Accord COUNCIL OF EUROPE EXPLANA-
TORY REPORT, supra note 150, ¶ 52; Kunz et al., supra note 174, at 442 (“There is no convinc-
ing reason why Swiss criminal law does not explicitly punish private bribery, especially since
the influence of Swiss banks, enterprises, and high tech companies with worldwide activities
exceeds by far the influence of the Swiss federal state.”).
258. See supra Part I.C.2 (describing the legislative approaches to private bribery).
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the offense should take action by outlawing both its domestic and transna-
tional forms. As the United Nations reminds us, “[t]he prevention and
eradication of corruption is a responsibility of all States, [for] [c]orruption
is no longer a local matter but a transnational phenomenon that affects all
societies and economies, making international cooperation to prevent and
control it essential.”259
The OECD and other international organizations can facilitate this
movement by implementing, through their successful convention
processes, provisions that prohibit active and passive forms of domestic
and transnational private bribery.260 The OECD Working Group’s current
reluctance and “caution about extending its mandate” to address private
bribery do not serve the public interest; this highly influential body should
be at the forefront of addressing the offense.261 As scholar Thomas Rose
has noted, “private sector bribery is the twin of bribery of public officials
and its condemnation is the natural next step of the OECD Working
Group.”262 The OECD should follow the lead of the Council of Europe
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, which set an example for all by
treating private bribery as a mandatory offense for its members.263
B. Merging Public and Private Bribery Prohibitions into
Comprehensive Legislation
If a country wishes to combat corruption in an adequate way, it must
criminalize private bribery, as anti-private bribery legislation is a necessary
component for any comprehensive anti-corruption strategy.264 The risk
that private agents will abuse power entrusted to them is arguably just as
high as the risk that public officials will abuse equivalent powers; moreo-
ver, a society’s laxness toward private bribery may elicit a business climate
conducive to public bribery by sending an implicit message that companies
may seek undue competitive advantage by bribing others265 Societies must
259. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 55, pmbl.
260. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (describing the OECD Working Group
on Bribery’s highly successful convention prohibiting transnational public bribery). The
United Nations Convention Against Corruption treats private bribery as an optional offense
to criminalize. The aims of the United Nations Convention would be better met if the Con-
vention shifted its treatment of private bribery from an optional to a mandatory offense to
criminalize. See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 55; OECD RE-
VIEW, supra note 209, at 11.
261. OECD REVIEW, supra note 209, at 11.
262. Rose, supra note 221, at 7.
263. See, Council of Europe Convention, supra note 47 (detailing the Council of Eu-
rope Criminal Law Convention on Corruption’s treatment of private bribery).
264. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 150, art. 7
(“Criminalising private corruption appeared as a pioneering but necessary effort to avoid
gaps in a comprehensive strategy to combat corruption.”).
265. See Rohlfsen, supra note 99, at 152 (“One influential NGO has noted that permis-
siveness toward private sector bribery may foster a business climate conducive to bribery of
public officials.”).
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address both facets of corruption.266 In criminalizing private bribery, legis-
latures face a structural question as to how best to draft private bribery
legislation, namely, whether to draft it separate and apart from enacted
public bribery statutory prohibitions, or to couple it with public bribery
prohibitions into one comprehensive bribery offense.
The traditional approach legislatures take, of severing bribery into
separate and distinct public and private bribery offense categories, clashes
with conceptual understandings of the crime, as explored in Part II of this
Article, because public and private bribery are interconnected halves of
the same corrupt whole. For public and private bribery agreements,
whether they occur domestically or transnationally, “[t]he transaction [is]
nothing more or less than the acceptance by the agent of a bribe to per-
form his duties in the manner desired by the person who gave the
bribe.”267 Furthermore, maintaining separate public and private bribery
offenses creates application issues, as the distinctions between bribery in
the public and private sectors in many societies are increasingly blurred
and more difficult to differentiate. The growing privatization movement
contributes to the morphing of public and private sectors in this regard.268
The decision to differentiate statutorily the two types of bribery is the
weaker solution.
Consolidating public and private bribery offenses into one all-purpose
bribery statute yields practical benefits that serve the public interest. Con-
solidation draws the public’s attention to the significance of private brib-
ery, raises awareness of the crime’s existence, and reinforces that the
crime is part of the family of bribery offenses. The enactment of the Brib-
ery Act in the United Kingdom reflects such benefits. The Act addresses
public and private sector bribery through statutory text that prohibits ac-
tive and passive bribery without differentiating between public and private
types.269 By coupling together public and private bribery prohibitions into
one comprehensive bribery statute, the Act has generated significant pub-
lic discussion among legal professionals270 and the general public more
broadly,271 increasing awareness and equating the seriousness of private
266. See Kunz et al., supra note 174, at 442 (“[T]he risk of abuse of power in the private
sector exceeds the one in the public sector, so that the decision to criminalize only the bribery
of public officials, and not private bribery, does not really make sense.”).
267. Lum v. McEwen, 57 N.W. 662, 663 (Minn. 1894).
268. See supra Part II.C; Kunz et al., supra note 174, at 442.
269. See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 3 (U.K.) (noting, inter alia, that the Act applies to
“any function of a public nature, . . . any activity connected with a business, [and] any activity
performed in the course of a person’s employment . . .”).
270. See, e.g., The New UK Bribery Act: Why GCC Companies Need to Be Prepared,
CLIFFORD CHANCE 1 (2011), http://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/
PDFs/DUBAI-1-Client_Briefing__UK_Bribery_Act_for_GCC_companies.pdf (noting that
the Bribery Act criminalizes private bribery); Davina Garrod & Gordon Davidson, UK Brib-
ery Act: Current Enforcement Trends, BINGHAM (2012), http://www.bingham.com/Alerts/
2012/03/UK-Bribery-Act-Current-Enforcement-Trends (same).
271. See, e.g., New Legislation – Bribery Act 2010, NATIONAL PRESCRIBING CENTER
(May 11, 2011), http://www.npc.nhs.uk/rapidreview/?p=3449 (discussing Bribery Act’s private
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bribery with its public bribery twin. Rhode Island also follows a combined
approach with comprehensive active and passive bribery statutes that en-
compass public and private bribery as part of a single statutory design.272
International organizations are slowly aligning with this inclusive ap-
proach. The ICC Rules on Combating Corruption, “intended as a method
of self-regulation by business against the background of applicable na-
tional law and key international legal instruments,” combines public and
private bribery prohibitions into one comprehensive bribery rule, which
does not differentiate between domestic and foreign-based bribes.273 Since
1977, the ICC consistently has declared that “no meaningful distinction
exists between public and private bribery, that they both distort commer-
cial dealings and that they deserve similar treatment in the law.”274
Combining public and private bribery prohibitions into one offense
shifts the range of private bribery sanctions to a more appropriate level
that balances with penalties for public bribery. Rhode Island, for instance,
punishes bribery violations, whether public or private, as felonies, with
maximum twenty year prison sentences and/or fines that roughly match
the monetary equivalent of the attendant bribes’ value.275 Conversely, a
private bribery violation in France carries a maximum two year imprison-
ment penalty with a fine of 30,000 Euros. As noted by French scholar
Ste´phane Bonifassi, “[t]hese are mild sanctions when compared to the
maximum penalties for public corruption (ten years imprisonment and a
fine of 150,000 Euros).”276 Private bribery in many countries is minimally
penalized, but combining this offense statutorily with public bribery can
set more appropriate sanctions for this crime.277
Finally, a comprehensive bribery statute should criminalize public and
private bribery as it transpires internationally. “The policy rationale for
prosecuting foreign public bribery seems equally applicable to foreign
commercial bribery,”278 as both forms of bribery in international business
bribery component); BRITISH BANKERS ASS’N (BBA), BRIBERY ACT 2010 GUIDANCE ON
COMPLIANCE PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES FOR THE BANKING SECTOR (2011), avail-
able at https://www.bba.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Bribery_Guidance_-_final.pdf
(explaining that “bribery in both the public and private sectors are covered” under the Brib-
ery Act).
272. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-7-4 (2012) (“Bribery of agent, employee, or public offi-
cial”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-7-3 (2012) (“Solicitation or acceptance of bribe by agent, em-
ployee, or public official”). See also Rohlfsen, supra note 99, at 163 (discussing Rhode Island
bribery law).
273. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE [ICC}, ICC RULES ON COMBATING
CORRUPTION 4 (2011), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/Data/Policies/2011/ICC-Rules-on-
Combating-Corruption-2011. See also Rohlfsen, supra note 99 at 156 (“ICC makes no distinc-
tion between public officials or private persons, whether foreign or domestic.”).
274. Rose, supra note 221, at 1.
275. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-7-5 (2012).
276. Bonifassi, supra note 17 at 101.
277. See, e.g., Uberhofen, supra note 113, at 120 (noting that private bribery in Ger-
many is “only minimally penalized.”).
278. RUPP & FINK, supra note 91, at 4.
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transactions distort competition, weaken economic development, and un-
dermine confidence in the marketplace.279 Virtually no country has fo-
cused on deterring transnational private bribery through robust
enforcement actions,280 but given the integration of the global economy,
policy makers must formally begin to combat the offense.281 Otherwise,
one may easily circumvent a domestic focused bribery statute by con-
ducting the bribe overseas.282
The U.K. Bribery Act provides a useful example of a suggested statu-
tory test that countries may adopt to prohibit active and passive instances
of public and private bribery domestically and transnationally.283 The Act
is a prototype for unified domestic criminal private bribery legislation with
extraterritorial reach. Adopting such a comprehensive bribery statute is a
necessary step to direct much-needed prosecutorial attention to bribery in
its varied forms.
CONCLUSION
Many jurisdictions across the world actively combat public bribery
through criminal legislation and rigorous law enforcement measures. Far
fewer address its twin, private bribery. Both forms of bribery cause a mul-
titude of harms to the public and private sectors, but the conceptual simi-
larities between the bribery forms, and the harms they cause, are widely
misunderstood or ignored. This Article advocates for a unified approach in
combatting both forms of corruption as they transpire within and across
jurisdictions.
279. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen, United States Dep’t of Justice, Speech at
the 24th National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010), available
at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2010/crm-speech-101116.html.
280. See, e.g., supra Part I.C.2 (discussing transnational private bribery enforcement ef-
forts); Rupp & Fink, supra note 91 (“Foreign commercial bribery is not yet a primary focus of
U.S. enforcement activity.”).
281. See Henderson & Guida, supra note 169, at 553.
282. See Aman, supra note 183, at 1697 (“The concept of the globalizing state signifies a
state that no longer has a monopoly on the policies it creates and promulgates, but must
increasingly cooperate, bargain, and partner with other states and private entities to achieve
its goals.”).
283. See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 1 (U.K.).
